Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

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Tuesday, November 24, 2009

Tacit Collusion with Price-Matching Punishments

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Yuanzhu Lu, China Economics and Management Academy, Central University of Finance and Economics and Julian Wright, National University of Singapore (NUS) - Department of Economics analyze Tacit Collusion with Price-Matching Punishments.

ABSTRACT: Tacit collusion is explored under a strategy in which, loosely speaking, firms match the lowest price set by any firm in the previous period. Conditions are provided under which this strategy supports collusive outcomes in a subgame perfect equilibrium. In contrast to traditional results, the highest collusive price is always lower than the monopoly price. It corresponds to the unique Nash equilibrium price when upward and downward price deviations are matched. Our paper provides a game theoretic interpretation of the old kinked demand curve theory which unlike earlier attempts does not depart from standard timing assumptions to do so.

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2009/11/tacit-collusion-with-pricematching-punishments.html

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Comments

Tacit collusion is explored under a strategy in which, loosely speaking, firms match the lowest price set by any firm in the previous period. Conditions are provided under which this strategy supports collusive outcomes in a subgame perfect equilibrium. In contrast to traditional results, the highest collusive price is always lower than the monopoly price.

Posted by: clavier | Nov 25, 2009 11:44:55 PM

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