Competitive Effects of Vertical Integration with Downstream Oligopsony and Oligopoly

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Simon Loertscher (University of Melbourne) and Markus Reisinger (University of Munich) address Competitive Effects of Vertical Integration with Downstream Oligopsony and Oligopoly. 

ABSTRACT: We analyze the competitive effects of backward vertical integration by a partially vertically integrated firm that competes with non-integrated firms both upstream and downstream. We show that vertical integration is procompetitive under fairly general conditions. It can be anticompetitive only if the ex ante degree of integration is relatively large. Interestingly, vertical integration is more likely to be anticompetitive if the industry is less concentrated. These results are in line with recent empirical evidence. In addition, we show that even when vertical integration is procompetitive, it is not necessarily welfare enhancing.