October 22, 2009
Bundling and Competition for Slots: On the Portfolio Effects of Bundling
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Doh-Shin Jeony (Toulouse School of Economics, Universitat Pompeu Fabra) and Domenico Menicucci (Università degli Studi di Firenze) explain Bundling and Competition for Slots: On the Portfolio Effects of Bundling.
ABSTRACT: We consider competition among sellers when each of them sells a portfolio of distinct products to a buyer having limited slots. We study how bundling affects competition for slots. Under independent pricing, equilibrium often does not exist and hence the outcome is often inefficient. When bundling is allowed, each seller has an incentive to bundle his products and an efficient equilibrium always exists. Furthermore, in the case of digital goods, all equilibria are efficient if slotting contracts are prohibited. We also identify portfolio e¤ects of bundling and analyze the consequences on horizontal mergers. Finally, we derive clear-cut policy implications.
October 22, 2009 | Permalink
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