Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

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Thursday, August 20, 2009

Fines Against Hard Core Cartels in Europe: The Myth of Over Enforcement

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Emmanuel Combe, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1) and Constance Monnier, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1) discuss Fines Against Hard Core Cartels in Europe: The Myth of Over Enforcement.

ABSTRACT: Based on a sample of 64 cartels convicted by the European Commission from 1975 to 2009 and a methodology allowing to estimate restitution and dissuasive fines to be imposed on cartels from microeconomic variables on a case by case basis, this paper compares the level of fines actually inflicted to cartels participants to the illicit gain captured by the firms and estimates a range of restitution and dissuasive fines in each case. Our results show that fines imposed against cartels by the European Commission are overall sub optimal, whatever the level of the probability of detection.

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2009/08/fines-against-hard-core-cartels-in-europe-the-myth-of-over-enforcement.html

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