Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

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Monday, August 31, 2009

Divisionalization and Horizontal Mergers in a Vertical Relationship

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Tomomichi Mizuno, Competition Policy Research Center - Japan Fair Trade Commission has a paper on Divisionalization and Horizontal Mergers in a Vertical Relationship.

ABSTRACT: In this paper we evaluate the effects of horizontal mergers in a vertical relationship. Each downstream firm can create autonomous divisions. We show that an infinitesimal merger of downstream firms may exhibit a positive welfare effect if the upstream and downstream sectors are sufficiently unconcentrated. However, any merger of upstream firms reduces social welfare. Moreover, a decrease in the concentration in the upstream stage (respectively downstream stage or non-merging stage) makes the welfare effects of the merger in the upstream stage (respectively downstream stage or non-merging stage) less negative (respectively ambiguous or ambiguous).

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2009/08/divisionalization-and-horizontal-mergers-in-a-vertical-relationship.html

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