August 13, 2009
Banking Deregulations, Financing Constraints and Firm Entry Size
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
William R. Kerr (Harvard Business School, Entrepreneurial Management Unit) and Ramana Nanda (Harvard Business School, Entrepreneurial Management Unit) examine Banking Deregulations, Financing Constraints and Firm Entry Size.
ABSTRACT: We examine the effect of US branch banking deregulations on the entry size of new firms using micro-data from the US Census Bureau. We find that the average entry size for startups did not change following the deregulations. However, this result masks the differences in entry size among startups that failed within three years of entry and those that survived for four years or more. Long-term entrants started at a 2% larger size relative to their size in their fourth year, while churning entrants were no larger. Our results suggest that the banking deregulations had two distinct effects on the product market. On the one hand, they allowed entrants to compete more effectively against incumbents by reducing financing constraints and facilitating their entry at larger firm sizes. On the other hand, the process of lowering financing constraints democratized entry and created a lot more churning among entrants, particularly at! the low end of the size distribution. Our results highlight that this large-scale entry at the extensive margin can obscure the more subtle intensive margin effects of changes in financing constraints.
August 13, 2009 | Permalink
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