Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

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Tuesday, July 14, 2009

The Effect of Entry on R&D Investment of Leaders: Theory and Empirical Evidence

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Dirk Czarnitzki (K.U.Leuven, Dept. of Managerial Economics, Strategy and Innovation), Federico Etro (University of Milan, Bicocca, Dept. of Economics) and Kornelius Kraft (Technical University of Dortmund, Dept. of Economics) analyze The Effect of Entry on R&D Investment of Leaders: Theory and Empirical Evidence.

ABSTRACT: We develop a simple model of competition for the market that shows that, contrary to the Arrow view, endogenous entry threat in a market induces the average firm to invest less in R&D and the incumbent leader to invest more than the average firm. We test these predictions with a Tobit model based on a unique dataset and survey for the German manufacturing sector (the Mannheim Innovation Panel). In line with our predictions, endogenous entry threats perceived by the firms reduce R&D intensity for the average firm, but not for an incumbent leader. Moreover, the size of the firms and their patent stocks, proxy for the protection of IPRs, are positively related to R&D intensity. These results hold after a number of robustness tests with instrumental variables.

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2009/07/the-effect-of-entry-on-rd-investment-of-leaders-theory-and-empirical-evidence.html

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