June 29, 2009
Tacit Collusion over Foreign Direct Investment under Oligopoly
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
David Collie (Cardiff Business School) examines Tacit Collusion over Foreign Direct Investment under Oligopoly.
ABSTRACT: A two-country model of the FDI versus export decisions of firms is analysed. The analysis considers both the Cournot duopoly and the Bertrand duopoly models with differentiated products. It is shown that the static game is often a prisoners' dilemma where both firms are worse off when they both undertake FDI. To avoid the prisoners' dilemma, in an infinitely-repeated game, the firms can collude over their FDI versus export decisions. Then, a reduction in trade costs may lead firms to switch from exporting to undertaking FDI when trade costs are relatively high. Also, collusion over FDI may increase welfare.
June 29, 2009 | Permalink
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