April 23, 2009
Incomplete Regulation, Asymmetric Information and Collusion-Proofness
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Marco Meireles (Universidade do Porto - Economics) and Paula Sarmento (Universidade do Porto - Economics) address Incomplete Regulation, Asymmetric Information and Collusion-Proofness in a new paper.
ABSTRACT: In an incomplete regulation framework the Regulator cannot replicate all the possible outcomes by himself since he has no influence on some firms present in the market. When facing asymmetric information regarding the regulated firm’s costs, it may be better for the Regulator to allow the other competitors to extract a truthful report from her through side-payments in a collusion and therefore the “Collusion-Proofness Principle” may not hold. In fact, by introducing an exogenous number of unregulated competitors, Social Welfare differences seem to favour a Collusion-Allowing equilibrium. However, such result will strongly depend on the relative importance given by the Regulator to the Consumer Surplus.
April 23, 2009 | Permalink
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