March 27, 2009
Why Different Jurisdictions Do Not (and Should Not) Adopt the Same Antitrust Rules
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
David Evans (University of Chicago, University College London, LECG) makes the persuasive case Why Different Jurisdictions Do Not (and Should Not) Adopt the Same Antitrust Rules.
ABSTRACT: This article summarizes the theory on the optimal design of antitrust rules and discusses the application of such theory in different jurisdictional settings. It establishes the proposition that divergence is the norm for antitrust rules. This paper argues that the quest for convergence is quixotic and the disdain when another jurisdiction has a different rule than one's own is uncalled for. Along the way it considers two beacons of divergence that appeared on either side of the Atlantic at the end of 2008 - the US Department of Justice's report on unilateral conduct and the European Commission's enforcement guidelines on abusive exclusionary conduct.
March 27, 2009 | Permalink
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Along similar lines of thought, it was interesting to hear John Fingleton, chairman of the UK's Office of Fair Trading, on the ABA Spring meeting:
Convergence on single firm conduct isn't necessarily the goal, given different countries' economic situations. "We need to change the language from ‘convergence' to ‘convergence and informed divergence'," he said, adding that while in some countries it's correct to have a hands-off regime, others have different requirements. Not all agencies have enough firepower to do complex economic analysis, and in that situation it can be useful to have certain presumptions on dominant behaviour, Fingleton said.
(Reported by the Global Competition Review: http://www.globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/13147/aba-debates-antitrust-downturn/)
Posted by: Balazs | Mar 30, 2009 6:51:36 AM