Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

A Member of the Law Professor Blogs Network

Saturday, November 15, 2008

Setting the Standard: A Fraud-based Approach to Antitrust Pleading in Standard Development Organization Cases

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

James Esten Abell, an associate at Cleary, published a nice student note while at the University of Chicago in the Law Review on Setting the Standard: A Fraud-based Approach to Antitrust Pleading in Standard Development Organization Cases.

ABSTRACT: This Comment addresses the question of whether claims brought under Section 2 of the Sherman Act based on allegations of deception of a Standards Development Organization ("SDO") must meet the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b). Despite the growing amount of litigation in this area, to date, no court has specifically addressed this matter. The Comment explores how courts have approached similar questions in other areas involving intellectual property law and antitrust law, such as Walker Process fraud claims. Ultimately, the Comment suggests a framework for evaluating these new claims and concludes that within the framework, SDO-based antitrust claims do meet the requirements for heightened pleading.

November 15, 2008 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Friday, November 14, 2008

Deb Garza to Head DOJ Antitrust

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

The new head of DOJ Antitrust is Deb Garza, according to a White House press release.  Most recently she has been a DAAG and before that a partner at Fried Frank and Covington.  She is a University of Chicago law grad.

HT: Antitrust Review

November 14, 2008 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

The Past, Present, & Future of Stand-Alone Section 5 Competition Enforcement at the FTC: Is N-Data a New Direction or a Mere Diversion?

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act empowers the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC” or “Commission”) to prohibit “unfair methods of competition.” Congress left these terms largely undefined in order to provide the new agency with broad and flexible authority to address threats to competition. Not surprisingly, the Commission has grappled with how to apply its mandate throughout its history.

On the one hand, the Supreme Court has suggested that the FTC has great discretion to condemn behavior it deems “unfair.” The Court in Sperry & Hutchinson held that Section 5 empowered the FTC to “define and proscribe an unfair competitive practice, even though the practice does not infringe either the letter or the spirit of the antitrust laws” and to “proscribe practices as unfair or deceptive in their effect on competition.” It has acknowledged the breadth of Section 5 elsewhere, finding that the unfairness standard encompasses “not only practices that violate the Sherman Act and other antitrust laws, but also practices that the Commission determines are against public policy for other reasons.”

On the other hand, the FTC has struggled in the modern era to apply its authority beyond the four corners of the antitrust laws. The Commission’s action in N-Data has revived the debate over the Commission’s authority under Section 5.

November 14, 2008 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

COMPASS LEXECON is Looking to Hire Economist and Econometrician Candidates

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Compass Lexecon, one of the world's leading economic consulting firms, specializes in financial and economic analysis of regulatory, policy and litigation matters. Compass Lexecon has been engaged by Fortune 500 corporations, governments, and other public-sector entities to assist in numerous high profile mergers, government investigations, and private litigation matters in the United States and worldwide. Compass Lexecon provides significant economic research capabilities that combine the academic, private-sector, and public-sector experiences of in-house experts and academic affiliates with experienced economists.

JOB QUALIFICATIONS:

Compass Lexecon is seeking economist and econometrician candidates for our Cambridge, MA, Chicago, IL, Los Angeles, CA and San Francisco, CA and Oakland, CA, and Washington, DC offices. Ideal candidates will have a Ph.D. in a relevant field from an esteemed university. Relevant academic, government or consulting experience is preferred, not required. All candidates must possess strong communication skills and the desire to work in a collegial environment.

APPLICATION PROCEDURE:

Interested persons should apply by sending a cover letter, indicating office location preference, curriculum vitae, and a research paper. Applicants should also arrange for reference letters to be sent to the contact address. 

Please indicate on all submitted materials that you are applying for a position posted on the SSRN website.

CONTACT:       Compass Lexecon

                    332 S. Michigan Ave.

                    Chicago, IL 60604

     Fax:           312.322.0218

     Email:         MAILTO:knahas@compasslexecon.com

     Web:           http://www.compasslexecon.com

    

Compass Lexecon is an equal opportunity M/F/D/V affirmative action employer.

November 14, 2008 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

The Relationship between Public Antitrust Enforcement and Private Actions for Damages

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Wouter PJ Wils of the European Commission Legal Service has a worthwhile new working paper on The Relationship between Public Antitrust Enforcement and Private Actions for Damages.  Wouter's paper takes us further in our understanding of this very important question.  I will be presenting on this very topic in February at George Washington Law School based on some of my early stage empirical work on 50 years of US public and private actions for unilateral conduct.

ABSTRACT: This paper concerns the relationship between public antitrust enforcement and private actions for damages, focusing in particular on the enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC. In the first half of the paper, I examine the respective roles of public antitrust enforcement and private actions for damages. I argue that public enforcement should aim at clarifying and developing the antitrust prohibitions and deterring and punishing violations, whereas private actions for damages should aim at compensation. This corresponds to the approach adopted by the European Commission in its 2008 White Paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, and differs from the US approach which views damages actions as an instrument of deterrence. In the second half of the paper, I analyse a number of specific issues concerning the interaction between public antitrust enforcement and private actions for damages: the binding effect of the finding of a violation in public enforcement proceedings on follow-on actions for damages; access to the public enforcement file; encouragement of voluntary compensation through fine rebates, as a condition for leniency, or as part of settlements; punitive damages; private demand for public enforcement; the impact of private actions for damages on substantive law; and their impact on leniency.

November 14, 2008 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, November 13, 2008

A Tale of Two Sector Inquiries: Comparing and Contrasting Experiences in the U.K. and EU

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

The European Commission and the U.K. Competition Commission (“CC”) both have powers to carry out sector inquiries (or “market investigations” in the U.K. terminology) to investigate apparent restrictions or distortions of competition in particular markets within their jurisdictions. In each case, the statutory basis for inquiries has been reinforced within the past five years (Article 17 of Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 for the European Commission and Part 4 of the Enterprise Act 2002 for the CC). Each authority has carried out a number of inquiries under its revamped legislation (three by the European Commission; nine by the CC ) and each authority can, and does, request an enormous amount of information from companies in the course of an inquiry. However, the similarities between the two types of sector inquiries pretty much end there.

This article draws on experience of recent inquiries by the European Commission and the CC to compare the purpose and scope of their market inquiries, as well as to contrast the approach of the two authorities.

November 13, 2008 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Cartel Amnesties Granted: Worldwide Whistleblowers

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Jconnor John Connor of Purdue University's Applied Economics Department provides a very useful empirical study on Cartel Amnesties Granted: Worldwide Whistleblowers.

ABSTRACT: This paper describes and analyzes the outcomes of cartel-whistleblower programs around the world, including those of the United States and Canada, which keep the identities of amnesty recipients secret before and after a case is closed. A total of at least 65 corporations have received full leniency from 16 antitrust authorities that made 110 amnesty decisions. These companies, several of them recipients of multiple amnesties, participated in 84 international cartels that ended from 1994 to 2008. By reducing public information on the identities of previous whistleblowers, the confidentiality policies of the DOJ and some other authorities appear to reduce the number of cartels to be detected in the future.

November 13, 2008 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

How to Have a Distinctive and Useful Antitrust Role for Section 5 of the FTC Act

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Lande Robert H. Lande of the University of Baltimore Law School suggests How to Have a Distinctive and Useful Antitrust Role for Section 5 of the FTC Act.

ABSTRACT: This paper makes two points. First, Section 5 of the FTC Act, properly construed, is indeed significantly broader and more encompassing than the Sherman Act or Clayton Act. Section 5 violations include incipient violations of the other antitrust laws, and also violations of their policy or spirit.

Second, the best - and probably the only - way to interpret Section 5 in an expansive manner is to do so in a way that also is relatively definite, predictable, principled and clearly bounded. This best can be done if Section 5 is articulated using the consumer choice framework. Without the discipline and constraints provided by this framework, the FTC Act risks becoming unduly standardless. Unless the Commission uses the choice framework, any attempt to construe Section 5 that goes beyond the other antitrust laws risks being viewed as giving undue discretion to the Commission, and for this reason probably will not be permitted by reviewing courts.

The paper also presents three illustrations of how this could make a beneficial difference in practice: situations similar to the N Data case, invitations to collude, and incipient tying and exclusive dealing violations.

November 13, 2008 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Pre-merger Notification Mechanisms: Incentives and Efficiency of Mandatory and Voluntary Schemes

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Aldo Gonzalez (University of Chile - Department of Economics) and Daniel Benitez (World Bank) have a new paper on Pre-merger Notification Mechanisms: Incentives and Efficiency of Mandatory and Voluntary Schemes.

ABSTRACT: We compare the two current merger control mechanisms employed worldwide: The mandatory system contingent on the merger size and the voluntary with ex-post monitoring. On the basis of the existing literature and our own work, we conclude that the voluntary system has two main advantages compared to the mandatory regime: (i) It allows the competition agency to discretionally select the mergers to investigate. (ii) It employs fewer resources in controlling a given set of mergers due to the ex-post monitoring action. The superiority of the voluntary system relies on the ability of the antitrust system to apply penalties for unlawful omission to notify and to promptly react to stop the consummation of likely anticompetitive mergers. These conditions may not be satisfied in economies with weak enforcement of law or with insufficient experience in antitrust supervision.

Download merger_notification_oct22.pdf

November 13, 2008 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, November 12, 2008

LG, Sharp, Chunghwa Agree to Plead Guilty, Pay Total of $585 Million in Fines for Participating in Lcd Price-fixing Conspiracies

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Cartels are in the news today in the US as with the EU.  The DOJ just released word that LG, Sharp, Chunghwa Agree to Plead Guilty, Pay Total of $585 Million in Fines for Participating in Lcd Price-fixing Conspiracies.

November 12, 2008 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Why Antitrust is More Interesting Than Any Other Area of Law

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

10 Reasons Why Antitrust Practice is More Interesting Than Any Other Area of Law (Tax law comes in second)

  1. Academics are relevant in terms of policy and consistently have taken important leadership roles in both federal agencies.  This is not the case with other federal regulatory agencies.
  2. The Antitrust Law Journal is the 101st most cited law review in the country but unlike nearly all journals ahead of it on the list (all but 8), is peer reviewed and has lots of economists publishing in it. 
  3. Senior academic Professors of Economists regularly take leave to spend a two year stint in DC as chief economist at the DOJ and FTC (including, most recently, the guy who literally wrote the book on IO).  Compare this with other agencies where Associate Professors with less name power and fewer publications often are appointed chief economist.
  4. Our practitioners are high end - with a complex field of regulation this is not surprising.
  5. Whereas in other areas of law, law review articles have lost meaning, in antitrust decisions, judges regularly cite articles and books on the subject.
  6. Economists play a significant role in understanding and shaping the law.
  7. As Dan Crane points out, antitrust is no longer a hot button political issue.  As antitrust has become more technocratic, this means that you actually have to fully think through your arguments.
  8. How many other sections of the ABA publish as much as the Antitrust Section or as sophisticated a series of outputs as the Antitrust Section?
  9. The top European law students choose antitrust because that is where the action is in Europe.  In the US, this is seen as a specialty course but maybe with an Obama administration that will bring more cases (and potentially high profile ones), antitrust will be even hotter among US law school classes.
  10. Antitrust practice in the US has become increasingly international, which adds to the complexity of work in the field.

November 12, 2008 | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)

Highest Cartel Fines Ever Imposed by the European Commission

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

According to a press release from the EU:

The European Commission has imposed fines, totalling €1 383 896 000 on Asahi, Pilkington, Saint-Gobain and Soliver for illegal market sharing, and exchange of commercially sensitive information regarding deliveries of car glass in the EEA, in violation of the EC Treaty’s and the EEA Agreement’s ban on cartels and restrictive business practices (Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement). Asahi, Pilkington and Saint-Gobain are the three major players in Europe. Between early 1998 and early 2003 these companies discussed target prices, market sharing and customer allocation in a series of meetings and other illicit contacts. The Belgian company Soliver also took part in some of these discussions. These four companies controlled about 90% of the glass used in the EEA in new cars and for original branded replacement glass for cars at that time, a market worth about €2 billion in the last full year of the infringement. The Commission started the cartel investigation on its own initiative following a tip-off from an anonymous source. The Commission increased the fines on St Gobain by 60% because it was a repeat offender. Asahi provided additional information to help expose the infringement and its fine was reduced by 50% under the Leniency Notice. These are the highest cartel fines Commission has ever imposed, both for an individual company (€896 000 000 on Saint Gobain) and for a cartel as a whole.

HT to Conor Maguire at Brussels Matters

November 12, 2008 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

The Effects of Anti-competitive Business Practices on Developing Countries and their Development Prospects

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

UNCTAD has release an almost 700 page book available for download titled The Effects of Anti-competitive Business Practices on Developing Countries and their Development Prospects.

BOOK HIGHLIGHTS: During the last decade, many developing countries have adopted or are in the process of enacting competition laws. There is growing awareness among developing countries of the adverse effects of anti-competitive practices on their economies as well as their populations. The effects of such practices are not easily quantifiable and may therefore not be obvious. Nevertheless, developing countries have come to recognize the potential benefits that can be derived from competition law enforcement. The drive to establish legal and institutional frameworks in order to fight anti-competitive practices has intensified in recent decades.

In over three decades working with many developing countries across the globe, UNCTAD has accumulated a wealth of knowledge and expertise in making competition law and policy work for development. The Accra Accord (paragraph 104) recognizes that "UNCTAD is the focal point for the work on competition policy and related consumer welfare within the United Nations system. It provides to its Member States a forum for intergovernmental policy dialogue and consensus building in the area of competition laws and policies. … a forum to discuss competition issues on the multilateral level, … . UNCTAD´s work in this area should promote competition law regimes that take into account the prevailing conditions in the developing countries." Within this framework, the current publication brings together studies by practitioners and academics focussed on identifying the effects of anticompetitive practices on developing countries and their development prospects.

The various sections of this publication cover a wide range of cross-cutting competition issues. The publication highlights the synergies between competition and consumer laws and policies. It emphasizes the role of competition law and policy as a complementary policy tool in poverty alleviation. It also draws attention to competition concerns in commodity markets, which are of crucial importance to developing and least developed countries. Moreover, it provides lessons from a broad range of experiences from developed as well as developing countries, including economies in transition. The contributionof competition enforcement can often be indistinguishable from that of other economic policies in increasing efficiency and competition. Nonetheless, this publication upholds the view that competition law and policy are supportive of the overall process of economic development by curbing anti-competitive practices that negatively impact consumers and increase costs to business.

It is my hope that this publication, which is being launched at the ninth session of the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy in Geneva, in July 2008, will contribute to the enhanced understanding among government officials, private-sector stakeholders, consumer organizations and civil society of the necessity of competition law and policy and raise awareness on the damage caused by anti-competitive practices on the economies of developing countries.

I would like to reiterate that UNCTAD will continue to support developing countries in their efforts in adopting competition and consumer laws and establishing and strengthening the capacities of their competition authorities through technical assistance and capacitybuilding programmes.

November 12, 2008 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

An Economic Assessment of EC Merger Control: 1957-2007

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Bruce Lyons of the University of East Anglia provides An Economic Assessment of EC Merger Control: 1957-2007.

ABSTRACT: This paper provides an assessment of EC merger policy from three perspectives. First, it places the evolution of merger policy alongside the evolution of economic ideas in relation to competition and industrial organisation. Second, it highlights recent developments in the practical economic appraisal of competition in four areas: unilateral (non-coordinated) effects, particularly the appropriate use of simulation techniques and the efficiency defence; coordinated effects (collective dominance), particularly the role of the Community Courts; non-horizontal effects, particularly the need for the new guidelines; and remedies, particularly weaknesses in current practice. Third, it develops a simple bargaining approach to merger policy evaluation to draw conclusions about the trend in overall effectiveness of EC merger policy since 1989.

November 12, 2008 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, November 11, 2008

The Role of Fixed Cost Savings in Merger Analysis

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Robert Rubinovitz of NERA has a forthcoming article on The Role of Fixed Cost Savings in Merger Analysis.

ABSTRACT: Among the many motivations for mergers, clearly one of the more important considerations is the extent to which the merger will generate cost savings for the firms involved. Standard economic models demonstrate that a decrease in marginal cost leads to a lower price, whereas a decrease in fixed costs does not necessarily have this effect. Thus, from the Antitrust Agencies' perspective, in a merger analysis, emphasis should be placed on marginal cost savings because these efficiencies will create short-run benefits for consumers, in terms of lower price and higher output, and should be given the most weight. Of late, increasing attention has been given to how fixed cost savings can improve consumer welfare. One key insight is that demonstrating the direct effects of fixed cost savings on consumer welfare may require a longer time horizon than marginal cost savings or may require embedding these savings in a dynamic context. This paper exhibits an approach that provides straightforward predictions on the relationship between fixed costs, prices, and consumer welfare. When the fixed cost of producing quality decreases, it is shown that consumer welfare increases. The clear implication of this model is that fixed cost savings should be given weight in the analysis of the potential effects of a merger on consumer welfare.

November 11, 2008 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Pricing and Multi-Market Contact in the Cable TV Industry

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Robert Seamans, University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business has posted Pricing and Multi-Market Contact in the Cable TV Industry.

ABSTRACT: This paper links empirical literature on the use of price as an entry deterring mechanism with literature on the effect of multi-market contact on competition. The analysis uses a dataset of cable TV system prices to provide evidence that incumbent cable TV firms use price to deter entry by telecom overbuilders as well as cities with municipal utilities. There is also some evidence that multi-market contact with telecom overbuilders results in lower prices. However, there is no evidence that incumbents use price to deter cable overbuilders. In addition to linking entry deterrence with multi-market contact, this study has two other unique features. First, it establishes entry deterrence using two techniques, one of which relies on theory by Ellison and Ellison (2008) on non-monotonic price decreases in response to entry probability. Second, it uses detailed price and channel data at the service tier level.

November 11, 2008 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

More Gossip Mill: Forbes Weighs in On Possible Obama Picks at DOJ and FTC

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Forbes has a list of names that has added a few new players to the one the Daily Deal reported last week.  By including this type of information, does this blog become the antitrust equivalent of Page 6?

Bill Baer - Arnold & Porter 

Einer Elhauge - Harvard Law School

Bill Kolasky - WilmerHale

Jon Leibowitz - FTC*

Jan McDavid - Hogan & Hartson 

Doug Melamed - WilmerHale.

David Turetsky - Dewey & LeBoeuf 

Christine Varney - Hogan & Hartson

* Not to be confused with John Stuart Leibowitz of the Daily Show, who uses a different spelling of his middle name (John Stewart) as his last name for stage purposes.  John Stewart does not have an antitrust background but is sharp and witty and might nevertheless make a decent pick too.  Recall that one of the best FTC Chairmen of all time was Janet Steiger, who also lacked an antitrust background. 

November 11, 2008 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Will Europe Provide Effective Redress for Cartel Victims?

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Cohen Milstein Hausfeld & Toll has bet on the future of European private action.  In Will Europe Provide Effective Redress for Cartel Victims?, Vincent Smith of Cohen Milstein provides a sense of the past and future of European private rights.

ABSTRACT: This article gives an overview of the history of the development of private redress for competition law breaches in Europe. The article begins by reviewing the current proposals to improve private actions, examines the areas where further development is still required, and makes some suggestions as to how to tackle the most important of these. The issues discussed include how to determine which court should hear competition claims, how to institute a process that does not result in a multiplicity of actions across the European Union, and what system would ensure that claimants achieve effective redress while also being fair to defendants.

November 11, 2008 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, November 10, 2008

Research Handbook On Intellectual Property And Competition Law

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Out in press is the Research Handbook On Intellectual Property And Competition Law.

BOOK CHAPTERS:Preface Part I: Overarching Policies and Economic Theories Part II: Contractual Arrangements Part III: Unilateral Restraints Part IV: Merger Control Part V: The Effect of IP Laws as Such on Competition Part VI: National IP Rights and Cross-border Competition Index Contributors: S. Anderman, R.D. Anderson, E. Arezzo, J. Bejcek, B. Conde Gallego, J. Drexl, S. Enchelmaier, G. Ghidini, W.S. Grimes, C. Handke, A. Heinemann, C.A. Jones, O. Kolstad, A. Kur, M.-O. Mackenrodt, M.R. Patterson, O.-A. Rognstad, J. Shibata, P. Stepan, R. Towse, H. Ullrich

November 10, 2008 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Antitrust Law for the New Administration Conference

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Antitrust Law for the New Administration
January 26, 2009

Antitrust Law for the New Administration

Co-Presented by the American Antitrust Institute & the Silicon Flatirons Center

Antitrust law remains, as Robert Bork once put it, "at war with itself." In a recent episode, the war of words was quite literal, as the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission publicly sparred over the proper standards for the law of monopolization under the Sherman Act. Notably, the criticisms that Bork once leveled in the 1970s--that antitrust law viewed "big as bad," too quickly condemned vertical relationships, and used per se rules too liberally--are no longer applicable. Nonetheless, over the last several years, culminating in its recent report on the state of monopolization law, the Department of Justice has suggested that concerns over "false positives" still counsel against aggressive antitrust enforcement and has, in exercising its oversight authority, displayed a high level of reticence in challenging mergers.


With a new administration taking office and the publication of the American Antitrust Institute (AAI) report on "The Next Antitrust Agenda: The American Antitrust Institute's Transition Report on Competition Policy to the 44th President of the United States", it is an opportune occasion to evaluate the state of antitrust law and practice. Just over one year ago, the Antitrust Modernization Commission evaluated the state of antitrust law and largely embraced the status quo, declining to call for substantial changes to the doctrines, institutions, or practices of antitrust enforcement. The AAI report, by contrast, highlights a series of issues that merit attention. In this conference, we will evaluate the issues at the foresight of antitrust policy, placing them in one of four categories:

Monopolization, buyer power, and intellectual property;

Merger review;

Antitrust and regulated industries; and

Strategic planning, institutional strategies, and toward a research agenda for competition policy.

To spur a thoughtful and engaged discussion around such issues, we will bring together a leading group of policymakers, academics, and practitioners for a one-day conference.


Opening Remarks

1:15pm - 1:30pm

Bert Foer, President, American Antitrust Institute

Phil Weiser, Professor of Law, Interdisciplinary Telecommunications Program, University of Colorado;

Executive Director, Silicon Flatirons Center

Monopolization, Buyer Power, and Intellectual Property

1:30pm - 2:30pm

Ed Black, President and CEO, Computer and Communications Industry Association

Richard Brunell, Senior Fellow and Director, Legal Advocacy

American Antitrust Institute

Makin Delrahim, Partner, Brownstein Hyatt Farber & Schreck

Karma Guillianelli, Partner, Bartlit Beck


Merger Review

2:30pm - 3:30pm

Bill Kolasky (Invited), Partner, WilmerHale

Milton Marquis (Invited), Partner, Dickstein Shapiro

Roger Noll, Professor, Stanford University


Break

3:30pm - 3:45pm

 

Antitrust and Regulated Industries

3:45pm - 4:45pm

Jon Kwoka, Professor, Northeastern University

Sean Lindsay, Associate General Counsel, Qwest

Diana Moss, Vice President, American Antitrust Institute;

Adjunct Professor of Economics, University of Colorado

Jonathan Sallet, Silicon Flatirons Senior Adjunct Fellow,

University of Colorado; Partner, The Glover Park Group


Strategic Planning, Institutional Strategies, and Toward a Research Agenda for Competition Policy

4:45pm - 6:00pm

Bert Foer, President, American Antitrust Institute

Deb Garza, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division,

United States Department of Justice

Maurice Stucke, Professor, University of Tennessee College of Law

 

Keynote Address

6:00pm - 6:45pm

Jon Leibowitz (Invited), Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission

Reception

6:45pm - 7:30pm

 

6 General CLE Credits


Rates:

General Registration - $50

CU Alumni - $25

CU Faculty/Staff/Students - Free

Silicon Flatirons Sponsors - Free


Register here.

November 10, 2008 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)