Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

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Monday, October 27, 2008

The DOJ's Single-Firm Conduct Report: Promoting Consumer Welfare Through Clearer Standards for Section 2 of the Sherman Act

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Thomas O. Barnett and Hill B. Wellford of DOJ advocate for greater certainty in Sherman Section 2 in their support of the DOJ released Single Firm Conduct report.  Their article is The DOJ's Single-Firm Conduct Report: Promoting Consumer Welfare Through Clearer Standards for Section 2 of the Sherman Act.

ABSTRACT: On September 8, 2008, the Department of Justice (the "Department") issued a 213-page report entitled Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act (the "Single-Firm Conduct Report" or "Report").(1) The Report examines whether and when certain types of single-firm conduct may violate Section 2 of the Sherman Act by harming competition and consumer welfare. The Report serves three purposes. First, it summarizes and synthesizes views expressed at the joint Department and Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") hearings, recent legal and economic scholarship, and court decisions regarding single-firm conduct. Second, it provides transparency by explaining the Department's enforcement views in this important area of the law. And third, it makes progress toward the goal of developing sound, clear, objective, effective, and administrable standards for Section 2 analysis. Those standards best promote competition and consumer welfare–the goal of the antitrust laws–because they better identify and prohibit conduct that harms the competitive process and avoid interfering with the beneficial competition that drives innovation and economic growth.

The Single-Firm Conduct Report has been greeted with much discussion. The Department offers this article to add to the conversation by describing the background of the report, setting forth some of its key conclusions, and addressing some of the public commentary on the report. What this article does not attempt to do, however, is supplement or substitute for the report itself–the report stands on its own, and the reader is invited to review the report in its entirety or to review at least the report's six-page executive summary.

October 27, 2008 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Canadian Competition Bureau Seeks Comments on Draft Trade Associations Bulletin

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

According to a press release, the Canadian Competition Bureau seeks public comments on its Draft Information Bulletin on Trade Associations.

The purpose of the Bulletin is to provide information and guidance on how the Competition Act could apply to activities conducted by trade associations and their members that may raise concerns under the Act. It also provides an overview of the key provisions which could apply to these activities, and best practices that trade associations can adopt in order to avoid contravening the Act.

This Bulletin is part of the Bureau’s ongoing commitment to the development of enforcement and educational tools aimed at increasing the transparency and predictability of the Bureau’s application of the laws under its jurisdiction.

Interested parties are invited to provide comments by e-mail, fax, or regular mail no later than January 23, 2009 to:

Glenn Elder
  Senior Competition Law Officer
  Competition Bureau
  50 Victoria Street
  Gatineau, Quebec
  K1A 0C9
  Fax: (819) 953-1877
  E-mail: [email protected]

Submissions will be posted on the Bureau’s Web site unless it is specifically requested that they be kept confidential.

October 27, 2008 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

The 2009 Antitrust Review of the Americas

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

The Global Competition Review has just published The 2009 Antitrust Review of the Americas.

  • Foreword
    James Wilson, Chair of the Section of Antitrust Law, American Bar Association

    Vorys
  • The International Competition Network
    Maria Coppola Tineo
    US Federal Trade Commission

  • Introduction
    James J O'Connell Jr
    Deputy Assistant Attorney General
    Antitrust Division, US Department of Justice
  • International

  • International Leniency Agreements
    Michael Antalics, Nathan Bush, Hiroshi Naito, Philippe Noguès, Bilal Sayyed, Christine Wilson and Bo Yue

    O'Melveny & Myers LLP
  •       
  • EU & US Pricing
    W Todd Miller and Kimberly N Shaw
    Baker & Miller PLLC
  • US substantive areas

          
  • Anti-Cartel Enforcement
    Ray Hartwell and Djordje Petkoski

    Hunton & Williams LLP
  •          
  • Compliance
    Donald C Klawiter and Jennifer M Driscoll
    Mayer Brown LLP
  •          
  • Economics
    Celeste Saravia and Vandy Howell
    Cornerstone Research

  • Merger Control
    Kenneth P Ewing
    Steptoe & Johnson LLP

  • Monopolisation
    The Antitrust Practice Group
    Sullivan & Cromwell LLP
  •          
  • Pricing
    Rohit K Singla

    Munger, Tolles & Olson LLP
  • US special enforcement

  • Government Enforcement
    Ethan E Litwin and Richard E DiZinno
    Howrey LLP
  • Private Enforcement
    Joseph Ostoyich, David Emanuelson and Parker Normann
    Howrey LLP

  • US procedural issues

  • Class Actions
    Michael P Lehmann and Christopher L Lebsock
    Cohen Milstein Hausfeld & Toll                 
  • US industry sectors

  • Franchise
    Matthew Moloshok
    Hellring Lindeman Goldstein & Siegal LLP

  • Healthcare
    Michael S Lazaroff and Jaimi Gaffe
    Proskauer Rose LLP

  • Media and Entertainment
    Kenneth R Logan, Joseph F Tringali and Paul J Sirkis

    Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP                  
  •          
  • Telecoms and Media
    John D Harkrider

    Axinn Veltrop & Harkrider LLP
  • Argentina

  • Overview
    Miguel Angel De Dios

    De Dios & Goyena
  • Brazil

  • Cartels and Leniency
    Bruno Peixoto

    Lanna Peixoto Advogados
  • IP and Antitrust
    Mario Roberto V Nogueira, Ricardo Inglez de Souza and Bruno De Luca Drago
    Demarest E Almeida Advogados

  • Merger Control
    Mauro Grinberg and Natália Felix
    Barcellos Tucunduva Advogados

  • Telecoms
    Ubiratan Mattos, Maria Cecilia Andrade and Pedro C E Vicentini
    Mattos Muriel Kestener Advogados
  • Canada

  • Overview
    Yves Bériault and Oliver Borgers

    McCarthy Tétrault LLP


    Cartels and Leniency
    Barry Zalmanowitz and Susan E Paul
    Fraser Milner Casgrain LLP
  •          
  • Joint Ventures
    Mark Katz, Richard Elliot and Christopher Margison
    Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg LLP
  • Merger Enforcement Guidelines
    Richard Annan
    Goodmans LLP

  • Merger Notifications
    Yves Bériault and Oliver Borgers
    McCarthy Tétrault LLP
  • Monopolisation
    Denis Gascon and Sarah K McLean

    Ogilvy Renault LLP

  • Colombia

  • Overview
    Carlos Umaña and Jaime Moya

    Brigard & Urrutia Abogados
  • Mexico

  • Cartels
    Jorge A Sánchez-Dávila
    Goodrich, Riquelme y Asociados

  • Merger Control
    Amilcar Peredo and Carlos Orci

    Basham, Ringe y Correa

    Venezuela

  • Overview
    José Gregorio Torrealba
    Hoet Pelaez Castillo & Duque

           
  •        

    October 27, 2008 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

    Sunday, October 26, 2008

    Network Competition and Entry Deterrence

    Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

    Joan Calzada, University of Barcelona - Department of Political Economics and Tommaso M. Valletti, University of London - Imperial College discuss Network Competition and Entry Deterrence in their latest paper.

    ABSTRACT: We develop a model of logit demand that extends the traditional duopoly framework of network competition to a multi-firm industry. First, we show that incumbents establish the reciprocal access charge inefficiently below cost when they compete in prices but they behave efficiently if they compete in utilities. Secondly, we study how incumbents determine the industry-wide access charge under the threat of entry. We show that incumbents may accommodate all possible entrants, only a group of them, or may completely deter entry. When entry deterrence is the preferred option, incumbents distort the access charge upwards.

    October 26, 2008 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)