Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

A Member of the Law Professor Blogs Network

Saturday, May 3, 2008

Is the Coach Paid Too Much? Coaching Salaries and the NCAA Cartel

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Amy Farmer (University of Arkansas at Fayetteville - Department of Economics) and Paul Pecorino (University of Alabama - Department of Economics, Finance and Legal Studies) ask Is the Coach Paid Too Much? Coaching Salaries and the NCAA Cartel.

ABSTRACT: Recently a great deal of controversy has been generated from the salaries earned by head football coaches in the NCAA. On one level this seems odd since many figures in the world of sports and entertainment earn exceptionally high salaries. However, one important difference in the case of NCAA football is that the players themselves do not get paid. We develop a model which shows that a cartel agreement to not pay the players raises the coach's salary if some players choose where to play based on the identity of the coach. For some parameters, the gain in the coach's salary exceeds the loss in salary experienced by the player. On average, the agreement not to pay the players improves competitive balance.

May 3, 2008 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Friday, May 2, 2008

Cartels, Agency Costs, and Finding Virtue in Faithless Agents

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Cleslie_web Christopher Leslie of Chicago Kent College of Law provides an interest theory in Cartels, Agency Costs, and Finding Virtue in Faithless Agents.

ABSTRACT: Although price-fixing conspiracies are inherently unstable, many cartels manage to endure, often for long periods. Many successful cartels have hierarchical structures made up of high-level executives (principals) and lower-level managers (agents). For these cartels, agency cost theory could provide some insights as to how to destabilize them from within. Agency costs exist when a faithless agent pursues her own interests instead of those of the principal. Although agency costs are generally considered inefficient, when the principal’s goals are undesirable, the acts of a faithless agent can be beneficial. Because one traditional approach to reducing agency costs is to align the interests of the principal and agent, this Article argues that antitrust policy should maximize agency costs in cartels by decoupling these interests through several interrelated strategies. First, antitrust law should increase the severity and probability of criminal punishment of individuals who participate in price fixing. Second, antitrust law should reward individuals who expose cartel activity by providing them immunity from all criminal and civil liability and by paying antitrust bounties to such faithless agents. Finally, antitrust law should be structured so that employees of a cartel firm will not trust their employers to protect them should the cartel be exposed. This Article discusses how antitrust law can perform this decoupling function while minimizing any negative consequences of creating distrust within firms.

May 2, 2008 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Competition in the Airline Industry

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

In the wake of his successful airline deregulation conference earlier this year at the University of Houston, Darren Bush has penned along with my Wisconsin bound co-blogger Shubha Ghosh an interesting article on predation in the airline sector.  Also available is Darren's testimony to the Senate hearing on the impact of the proposed Delta/Northwest merger.

Download 4ghoshbush.pdf

Download airline_senate_hearing.doc

May 2, 2008 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Entry and Exit Event Analysis

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Paul Johnson of Bates White provides Entry and Exit Event Analysis in his latest paper.

ABSTRACT: Economists have analyzed incumbent responses to entry and exit by competitors as probative of competitive effects in several recent high profile mergers. This chapter argues that an incumbent's response to entry or exit may be probative of competitive effects of merger because these responses reveal whether premerger pricing is competitive and, therefore, whether the elimination of one competitive constraint through merger is likely to change competitive outcomes. This interpretation contrasts with the more common interpretation that simulates postmerger prices by equating the effects of entry and exit with merger. Such simulation may either overstate or understate the effects of merger, depending on the circumstances. This chapter also considers two types of issues that may arise in entry and exit event analysis. The first is in the interpretation of the estimated causal effects of entry and exit on incumbents. The second is in the estimation of these effects.

May 2, 2008 | Permalink | Comments (1) | TrackBack (0)

Thursday, May 1, 2008

Cross-Border Mergers in the EU: The Commission v. the Member States

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Michael Harker of the Univeristy of East Anglia - Norwich Law School writes on Cross-Border Mergers in the EU: The Commission v. the Member States in the most recent issue of the European Competition Journal.

ABSTRACT: This paper reviews and analyses cases where the Commission has taken action against Member States where the latter have either acted contrary to the exclusivity principle under the EC merger control regime, or have maintained in place ex ante measures with the purpose of seeking to control or deter cross-border investment in key strategic industries. Subject to very limited circumstances, such measures are contrary to the free movement of capital provisions of the EC Treaty. Nevertheless, on several notable occasions, Member States have been willing to use such powers, seemingly judging the political costs of standing by and permitting the merger to outweigh the (future) costs associated with infringement proceedings before the ECJ. In so doing, Member States have been able to modify transactions significantly and even frustrate them. Such cases pose serious problems for the stability of the EC merger regime, and have implications for the possibilities of expanding Community competence in this area.

May 1, 2008 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

UK Final Grocery Investigation is Out

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Yesterday the UK Competition Commission released its grocery sector investigation final report.  This is a very important study.  Australia will release its grocery study this summer.  Hopefully these studies (along with the Irish study last month) will improve our sense of how the govercery sector works.

May 1, 2008 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

IP as Competition Policy

Posted by Shubha Ghosh

My co-author Richard Gruner invited me to give a distinguished lecture at John Marshall Law School in Chicago this past Monday.  I spoke on the topic of IP as CP:  Competition Policy Norms in Intellectual Property Law.  The talk focused on recent Supreme Court decisions in the area of intellectual property law, particularly, Merck. Independent Ink, eBay, Medimmune, and KSR, and argued that this line of cases illustrates the Supreme Court's concerns with competition norms in intellectual property.   I contrasted the Supreme Court's views on competition with those of the Federal Circuit and used this contrast as background to understand what is at stake in the Quanta v. LG Electronics litigation that is before the Court this term.  An audio file of the talk can be downloaded here [Download JMTalk42808.WMA]  for those who are interested. 

May 1, 2008 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

OECD Seeks Head of Competition Outreach

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

The OECD has a great new opening.  See their ad below.

We are looking for a Head of Competition Outreach with substantial experience in competition policy analysis and the application of competition laws. The selected candidate will be responsible for developing, managing and leading the Division’s capacity building activities throughout the world.  This person will also assist the Head of Division in a variety of tasks supporting the work of the Competition Committee. S/he will also organise meetings and other events relating to competition policy in member and non-member countries. S/he will be expected to work with a large degree of initiative, reporting to the Head of the Competition Division (COMP) in the Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs (DAF).

Job Duties

1. Deliver technical assistance and policy advice
• Organise programmes to increase the capacities of competition enforcement staff and competition policy analysts by creating the structure and content of training programmes and preparing background notes and other technical documents for use in such programmes.
• Provide expert advice to senior competition officials on the drafting and implementation of competition laws, guidelines, commentaries and other official documents.
• Participate in a number of the programmes as chairperson and competition expert.

2.  Management, representation and co-ordination
• Lead the design, management and efficient implementation of OECD's capacity building activities in the area of competition policy.  Prepare activity plans and budgets for all such activities.  Ensure that all such activities, including country specific and regional programmes and all meetings of the Global Forum on Competition, the Latin American Competition Forum and the Seoul and Budapest Regional Centres for Competition are of high quality and delivered on time and within budget. 
• Monitor developments in the field of competition law and policy and support the development of sound competition law and policy in OECD and non-OECD countries. Organise and participate in external meetings on competition law and policy matters for government officials, including preparation of background notes and other technical documents.
• Develop effective working relationships with senior competition officials in OECD and non-OECD delegations and capitals and seek their active support for and involvement in the capacity building programme.
• Maintain effective working relationships with other parts of the Organisation and promote consistent, sound competition policy throughout the Organisation.
• Write documents on competition law and policy in support of the work of the Competition Committee. Prepare briefs and reports for the senior staff of the Organisation.
• Supervise the work of other staff and consultants. Help recruit, train and supervise support staff and trainees.
• Assist the Head of Division in the management of the Competition Division

3.  Programme development
• Maintain close and effective relationships with existing donors and develop new relationships to expand the programme in under-served countries and regions.  Actively engage in fund-raising to support the programme.
• Expand the capacity building programme in co-operation with national competition authorities, regional development banks and donor agencies. 
• Carry out other related duties as assigned.

Qualifications: education, experience, communication and languages

1.  Education and experience
• An advanced degree in law or economics, ideally specialised in competition law or industrial organisation.   
• Eight to ten years of experience in the application of competition law and policy in a national or international administration responsible for the enforcement of competition law or responsible for competition-oriented regulation or similar experience in the competition department of a major law firm.

2.  Key competencies
• Knowledge of substantive, procedural and institutional issues that arise in all aspects of competition law enforcement, including anti-cartel enforcement, merger control and control of abuse of a dominant position. Similar knowledge in the operation of competition advocacy programs. Knowledge of the competition regimes of several OECD Member countries would be an advantage.
• Management and organisational skills, including ability to plan and implement a programme of reviews of national competition laws and policies.  Ability to work efficiently under pressure with the capacity to prioritise tasks often according to tight deadlines.
• Ability to communicate effectively and to present documents and proposals clearly, concisely and convincingly at meetings with senior competition officials.
• A strong political sense and effective diplomatic skills; ability to achieve consensus and interact effectively with multiple high-level stakeholders.
• Demonstrated capacity to think strategically and creatively and strong conceptual and analytical capabilities. 

3.  Communication and OECD official languages
• Capacity to present highly technical subjects in writing as well as orally, in a manner which makes them accessible to high-level officials, political and opinion leaders.  Ability to communicate effectively and to present issues of competition law and policy clearly, concisely and convincingly.
• Very good interpersonal skills. Ability to foster and maintain fruitful working relations with national and international officials. Ability to motivate and supervise within a multicultural team and to adapt to various working methods.
• Excellent knowledge (reading, drafting and speaking) of one of the two official languages of the OECD ( English and French), and good knowledge of the other.

N.B. The appointment may initially be made at the level immediately below if the qualifications and professional experience of the selected applicant correspond to that level;  in this case, the duties and responsibilities assigned to the post will be adjusted accordingly.

May 1, 2008 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Horizontal Merger Simulation: A Complementary Tool to the Structural Analysis

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Tarcisio da Graca of the Brazilian Federal Senate writes about Horizontal Merger Simulation: A Complementary Tool to the Structural Analysis.

ABSTRACT: The authorities of the Brazilian competition system decide upon horizontal mergers and acquisitions that come to their review, applying the traditional structural analysis, as established by the Brazilian horizontal merger guidelines. This article aims at illustrating the refinement that can be achieved in the evaluation process of such cases, by using differentiated product horizontal merger simulation models. Applying both methodologies to hypothetical cases, I illustrate that the simulation results provide more precise information about their likely effects with richer details. This may be accomplished by using the same data required for the structural analysis. The use of the simulation model may also contribute to guide the discussion about the impact of the efficiencies generated by a merger and about the role of potential or real entries of new firms in the market place.

May 1, 2008 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Wednesday, April 30, 2008

Patent Pools, RAND Commitments, and the Problematics of Price Discrimination

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Daniel Crane of Cardozo Law School offers insightful analysis in Patent Pools, RAND Commitments, and the Problematics of Price Discrimination.

ABSTRACT: This is a book chapter forthcoming in Working Within the Boundaries of Intellectual Property Law (Harry First, Rochelle Dreyfuss, and Diane Zimmerman, eds., Oxford University Press), which will collect papers from the NYU Engelberg Center's 2007 conference at La Pietra, Florence. The paper highlights the complexities and potential abuses that arise when patent pools are used to implement standards created by standard setting organizations (SSOs). It summarizes the antitrust fixes that have been proposed by the patentees and generally approved by the antitrust agencies. The paper then explores the meaning of the chief antitrust fix - the patentees' commitment to license their patents on reasonable and nondiscriminatory (RAND) terms. The paper concludes by arguing that at least three conditions must be satisified for RAND commitments to be effective fixes: (1) understanding the RAND commitment as a contract enforceable by third parties; (2) placing the burden of justifying the proferred licensing terms on the patent pool; and (3) allowing for meaningful judicial review of licensing decisions by private arbitrators.

April 30, 2008 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

A Practical Application of Event Studies in Merger Assessment: Successes and Failures

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Ikokkoris Ioannis Kokkoris of the OFT and City University weighs in on A Practical Application of Event Studies in Merger Assessment: Successes and Failures.

ABSTRACT:  The stock market‘s reaction to news can be a particularly valuable source of information that may lead to inferences about the nature of a merger or a take-over. The idea underlying event studies is that the reaction of share prices - which reflect expectations about a firm‘s stream of future profits - will allow alternative hypotheses as to the consequences of a merger to be tested. By examining who gains and loses when mergers or merger challenges are announced, different hypotheses can be tested regarding expectations about market power or efficiency. Conducting an event study analysis for the merging parties as well as for rival firms, by comparing their actual stock price returns around the announcement date with a counterfactual measure of what the return would have been had the merger not taken place, would provide useful insights of the likely expectation of the market of the profitability in the post-merger market. This article will analyse the usefulness and efficiency of event studies for mergers and present a tractable way of implementing such analysis. It will include examples of efficient implementation of event studies, as well as, cases where the event study led to less satisfactory results.

April 30, 2008 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

The Role of Economic Evidence in Merger Control in Ireland: Current and Future Practice

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

A new article on The Role of Economic Evidence in Merger Control in Ireland: Current and Future Practice by Brendan O'Connor, Commission for Aviation Regulation; Cormac Keating, The Competition Authority; and Paul K. Gorecki, Competition Authority, Dublin provides us an overview of developments in the Celtic Tiger.

ABSTRACT: Having reviewed some 311 cases notified to the Irish Competition Authority during 2003-2006 this paper examines economic evidence and how it relates to factual and opinion evidence in testing for SLC. The analysis focuses on the use of economic evidence in the assessment of horizontal mergers with unilateral effects and sets out a framework for the application of economic evidence. The authors note that economic evidence was only relied on in a minority of cases, and never in isolation from factual and/or opinion evidence. Having reflected on some of the economic techniques used in Irish merger cases the authors conclude that there may be no more than a limited role for merger simulation models and analysed why, despite an extensive literature on their relevance to merger review, efficiencies have played only a minor role in merger notifications and have not been supported by quantitative evidence. Finally the authors discuss the incentives the underlie competitor and customer opinion evidence and how biases in opinion evidence can be controlled for.

April 30, 2008 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Tuesday, April 29, 2008

An International Competition Fund For the Developing World?

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

CUTS is floating an interesting proposal to fund developing world competition agencies through a fund made up of money from fines for developing world cartel overcharges.  See their policy report below.

Download INCSOC_briefing_IntCompFund.pdf 

April 29, 2008 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Thirty Years of Solitude: Antitrust Law and Physican Cartels

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Greaney Tim Greaney of St. Louis University Law School has an interesting essay on Thirty Years of Solitude: Antitrust Law and Physican Cartels.

ABSTRACT: For over thirty years the United States Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission (“Agencies”) have confronted bands of businessmen who have steadfastly refused to pay attention to legal precedent, repeated governmental pronouncements, and administrative sanctions imposed on their colleagues. The conduct revealed in these cases evidences a willingness to blatantly disregard the law by repeatedly undertaking arrangements already deemed illegal by the enforcers or by concocting schemes that raise untested but dubious justifications. Who are these lawbreakers? Organized criminals? Internet spam artists? Boiler-room operators? No, these cases involve physicians, some grouped in associations numbering in the thousands and almost always proceeding with the advice of business consultants and counsel. The conduct challenged by the government involves the formation of loosely-structured organizations, ranging from Independent Practice Associations to Preferred Provider Organizations (PPO) to other kinds of loose “networks” that collectively bargain with employers or managed care organizations for provider contracts.

The puzzle explored in this essay is why the government’s deployment of extensive resources has not curtailed physician attempts to engage in collective bargaining and other attempts to restrain price competition. It first analyzes the hypothesis that overly cautious government enforcement policies created a mismatch between penalties and rewards that invited abuse. While finding merit in this explanation, the essay offers a more nuanced account. It suggests that a convergence of factors including doctrinal shortcomings, political pressures, and institutional constraints may have deterred the Agencies from seeking stronger remedies and emboldened parties who questioned the role of competition in health markets generally. A related claim of this essay is that the Agencies may have inadvertently precipitated some of this conduct by the regulatory efforts they have undertaken. Finally, the essay offers some lessons learned from the FTC’s recent North Texas Specialty Physicians case.

Download final_greaney_pdf.pdf

April 29, 2008 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Competition Policy And Merger Analysis In Deregulated And Newly Competitive Industries

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

A forthcoming edited book by Peter Carstensen (University of Wisconsin Law) and Susan Beth Farmer (Pennsylvania State Law) provides insights on Competition Policy And Merger Analysis In Deregulated And Newly Competitive Industries.


1. Introduction and Overview
Peter C. Carstensen and Susan Beth Farmer

2. Mergers in the US Electric Power Industry      
Richard J. Pierce

3. Natural Gas Pipelines: Can Merger Enforcement Preserve the Gains from Restructuring?
Diana L. Moss

4. Telecommunications Mergers      
Jim Chen

5.  Merger Analysis in the Post-Staggers Railroad Industry 
Curtis M. Grimm

6. Airline Mergers – Second Best Results in a Change Environment   
Peter C. Carstensen

7. Hospital Mergers   
Thomas L. Greaney

8. Mergers and Competition Policy in the Banking Industry   
Bernard Shull

9. The European Experience with Merger and Deregulation    
Susan Beth Farmer

10. Reflections on Mergers and Competition in Formerly Regulated Industries
Peter C. Carstensen

April 29, 2008 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Monday, April 28, 2008

Pass-Through in Retail and Wholesale

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Emi Nakamura
of Columbia's Economics Department addresses Pass-Through in Retail and Wholesale in her latest working paper.

ABSTRACT: This paper studies how prices comove across products, firms and locations to gauge the relative importance of retailer versus manufacturer-level shocks in determining prices. I make use of a large panel data set on prices for a cross-section of retailers in the U.S. I analyze prices at the barcode or "Universal Product Code'' (UPC) level for individual stores. I find that only 16% of the variation in prices is common across stores selling an identical product. 65% of the price variation is common to stores within a particular retail chain (but not across retail chains), while 17% is completely idiosyncratic to the store and product. Product categories with frequent temporary "sales'' exhibit a disproportionate amount of completely idiosyncratic price variation. My results suggest that most of the observed price variation arises from retail-level rather than manufacturer-level demand and supply shocks. However, the behavior of prices is difficult to relate to observed variation in costs and demand at the retail level. This suggests that retail prices may vary largely as a consequence of dynamic pricing strategies on the part of retailers or manufacturers, rather than static demand and supply shocks.

April 28, 2008 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

The Great Global Vitamins Conspiracy: Sanctions and Deterrence

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Jconnor John Connor, the empiricist who has done more than any other academic to explain international cartels tells a compelling story about The Great Global Vitamins Conspiracy: Sanctions and Deterrence.

ABSTRACT: When they were discovered in 1999, the 16 vitamins cartels were probably the largest, most harmful, and harshest sanctioned international cartels of the late 20th century. Still today, the vitamins cartels are cited by antitrust authorities as the outstanding example of an enforcement action likely to deter cartel formation; this episode is also often mentioned by other legal experts as an egregious example of cartels subject to supra-optimal penalties.

This paper summarizes the structural conditions and price effects of the global vitamins conspiracy and analyzes the deterrence power of world-wide monetary penalties paid by the corporate members of these cartels.1 The paper concludes that only in North America did monetary antitrust penalties exceed the monopoly profits of the vitamins cartel, principally because of huge private settlements. Penalties in the EU were a small percentage of European overcharges, and penalties in the rest of the world were negligible. On a global basis, deterrence was sup-optimal for three major reasons: low penalties outside North America, delays in the collection of fines and private settlements (i.e., the absence of court-awarded prejudgement interest), and the low probability of discovery of hidden cartels.

April 28, 2008 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Bargaining in the Shadow of the European Microsoft Decision: The Microsoft-Samba Protocol License

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

My colleague William H. Page (University of Florida) and University of Florida law school student Seldon J. Childers have collaborated on Bargaining in the Shadow of the European Microsoft Decision: The Microsoft-Samba Protocol License.

ABSTRACT: In 2004, the European Commission held that Microsoft had abused its dominant position under Article 82 of the European Treaty by, among other actions, refusing Sun Microsystems' request for information Sun needed to interoperate with Windows workgroup server products. The EC ordered Microsoft to disclose complete and accurate specifications for the protocols used by Windows work group servers in order to provide file, print, and group and user administration services to Windows work group networks. In September 2007, the European Court of First Instance affirmed the EC's liability ruling and its remedial order. Last December, with the active encouragement of the EC, Microsoft reached a licensing agreement for the covered protocols with Samba, an open-source development project that produces server software that emulates the behavior of Microsoft's server operating systems. The Microsoft-Samba license agreement is by far the most important tangible outcome of the European Microsoft case. The EC's other remedial order in the case, which required Microsoft to create a version of Windows without Windows Media Player, was an embarrassing failure. The Samba agreement, however, is both significant and perilous for global antitrust policy. It provides critical protocols and documentation to Microsoft's most important rival in the server market, a rival, moreover, whose development methods are focused on the analysis of those very protocols. Samba is thus more likely to put the disclosures to effective competitive use than any other licensee. It is also possible that Microsoft will derive technical and competitive benefits from the interaction with the Samba team. The long-run peril is that the disclosures will go beyond the specifications that the CFI contemplated, and will allow Samba to clone Microsoft's proprietary algorithms. That result, although reducing prices in the short run, would inhibit dynamic competition by undermining the incentives of leading firms to innovate. 

April 28, 2008 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Sunday, April 27, 2008

Kudos to Spencer Waller

Posted by Shubha Ghosh

I just came back from Chicago where I attended Professor Spencer Waller's eighth antitrust colloquium.  The conference was stimulating and the discussion lively, with a wide range of viewpoints, both academic and practitioner being represented.   The day began with a presentation by Professor Maurice Stucke of The University of Tennessee Law School on the implications of Trinko and the hierarchy of enforcement by the antitrust agencies with cartels at the top, section 2 claims at the bottom, and mergers in the middle.  Professor Stucke challenged this hierarchy, raising questions about the normative view of competition that underlies antitrust law and the harmful consequences that can arise from monopolization.   Donald Baker's paper on the divergence between antitrust enforcement in the US and the EU continued the lively discussion in the late morning, particularly with Mr. Baker's arguments that the divergence had its roots in institutional and procedural differences on either side of the Atlantic.  Commentators pointed out divergence within the EU itself, particularly between the UK and the Continent.  The afternoon was rounded off with Professor Tim Greaney (of St Louis Univeristy Law School) presenting on antitrust after managed care and Professor Robert Lande (of The University of Baltimore Law School) presenting empirical work on the benefits of private antitrust enforcement.   Professor Greaney's talk underscored the difficulties of applying traditional antitrust analysis to the imperfect markets for the allocation and provision of health care services.  Professor Lande reported that the sizable awards in private antitrust litigation (both in terms of final judgments and settlements) provided an important deterrence function.

Congratulations to Professor Waller and the staff and fellows of the Institute.  All are encouraged to be on the look out for next year's conference and to submit papers and attend.

April 27, 2008 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)

Economics Of Antitrust Law

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

An excellent edited book of two volumes will hit book stands in June 2008, titled Economics Of Antitrust Law, which is edited by Benjamin Klein (UCLA) and Andres V. Lerner (LECG).


Volume I


Introduction The Role of Economics in the Development of Antitrust Law Benjamin Klein and Andres V. Lerner

1. Harold Demsetz (1973), ‘Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy’
2. William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner (1981), ‘Market Power in Antitrust Cases’
3. Franklin M. Fisher and John J. McGowan (1983), ‘On the Misuse of Accounting Rates of Return to Infer Monopoly Profits’
4. Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Robert H. Lande and Steven C. Salop (1987), ‘Monopoly Power and Market Power in Antitrust Law’
5. Jonathan B. Baker and Timothy F. Bresnahan (1992), ‘Empirical Methods of Identifying and Measuring Market Power’
6. Benjamin Klein (1993), ‘Market Power in Antitrust: Economic Analysis after Kodak’

A Oligopoly and Collusion
7. George J. Stigler (1964), ‘A Theory of Oligopoly’
8. Donald F. Turner (1962), ‘The Definition of Agreement under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal’
9. Richard A. Posner (1969), ‘Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach’
10. Franklin M. Fisher (1989), ‘Games Economists Play: A Noncooperative View’
11. Jonathan B. Baker (1993), ‘Two Sherman Act Section 1 Dilemmas: Parallel Pricing, the Oligopoly Problem, and Contemporary Economic Theory’

B Horizontal Mergers and Joint Ventures
12. Oliver E. Williamson (1968), ‘Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs’
13. Janusz Ordover and Robert D. Willig (1983), ‘The 1982 Department of Justice Merger Guidelines: An Economic Assessment’
14. Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro (1990), ‘Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis’
15. Jonathan B. Baker (2002), ‘Mavericks, Mergers, and Exclusion: Proving Coordinated Competitive Effects Under the Antitrust Laws’
16. Thomas M. Jorde and David J. Teece (1990), ‘Innovation and Cooperation: Implications for Competition and Antitrust’
17. Carl Shapiro and Robert D. Willig (1990), ‘On the Antitrust Treatment of Production Joint Ventures’

Name Index

Volume II


Introduction The Role of Economics in the Development of Antitrust Law Benjamin Klein and Andres V. Lerner

1. Aaron Director and Edward H. Levi (1956), ‘Law and the Future: Trade Regulation’
2. Frank H. Easterbrook (1984), ‘The Limits of Antitrust’

A Tying and Bundling
3. Ward S. Bowman, Jr. (1957), ‘Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem’
4. George J. Stigler (1963), ‘United States v. Loew’s Inc.: A Note of Block-Booking’
5. William James Adams and Janet L. Yellen (1976), ‘Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly’
6. Benjamin Klein and Lester F. Saft (1985), ‘The Law and Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts’
7. Michael D. Whinston (1990), ‘Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion’
8. Dennis W. Carlton and Michael Waldman (2002), ‘The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries’
9. Barry Nalebuff (2004), ‘Bundling as an Entry Barrier’

B Resale Price Maintenance and Exclusive Territories
10. Lester G. Telser (1960), ‘Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?’
11. Benjamin Klein and Kevin M. Murphy (1988), ‘Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms’
12. Pauline M. Ippolito (1991), ‘Resale Price Maintenance: Empirical Evidence From Litigation’

C Exclusive Dealing
13. Howard P. Marvel (1982), ‘Exclusive Dealing’
14. Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton (1987), ‘Contracts as a Barrier to Entry’
15. Eric Rasmusen, J. Mark Ramseyer and John S. Wiley, Jr. (1991), ‘Naked Exclusion’
16. Benjamin Klein and Andres Lerner (2007), ‘The Expanded Economics of Free-Riding: How Exclusive Dealing Prevents Free-Riding and Creates Undivided Loyalty’

A Predatory Pricing
17. John S. McGee (1958), ‘Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case’
18. Phillip Areeda and Donald F. Turner (1975), ‘Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act’
19. Janusz A. Ordover and Robert D. Willig (1981), ‘An Economic Definition of Predation: Pricing and Product Innovation’

B Raising Rivals’ Costs
20. Thomas G. Krattenmaker and Steven C. Salop (1986), ‘Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power Over Price’
21. Elizabeth Granitz and Benjamin Klein (1996), ‘Monopolization by “Raising Rivals’ Costs”: The Standard Oil Case’

April 27, 2008 | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)