November 11, 2008
Pricing and Multi-Market Contact in the Cable TV Industry
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Robert Seamans, University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business has posted Pricing and Multi-Market Contact in the Cable TV Industry.
ABSTRACT: This paper links empirical literature on the use of price as an entry deterring mechanism with literature on the effect of multi-market contact on competition. The analysis uses a dataset of cable TV system prices to provide evidence that incumbent cable TV firms use price to deter entry by telecom overbuilders as well as cities with municipal utilities. There is also some evidence that multi-market contact with telecom overbuilders results in lower prices. However, there is no evidence that incumbents use price to deter cable overbuilders. In addition to linking entry deterrence with multi-market contact, this study has two other unique features. First, it establishes entry deterrence using two techniques, one of which relies on theory by Ellison and Ellison (2008) on non-monotonic price decreases in response to entry probability. Second, it uses detailed price and channel data at the service tier level.
November 11, 2008 | Permalink
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