October 15, 2008
Vertical Restraints and the Law: Evidence from Automobile Franchising
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Giorgio Zanarone, Colegio Universitario de Estudios Financieros has a piece in the Journal of Law and Economics on Vertical Restraints and the Law: Evidence from Automobile Franchising.
ABSTRACT: This paper shows that, after a 2002 European regulation prohibited the use of dealer exclusive territories, automobile franchise contracts in Italy introduced price ceilings and standards on verifiable marketing and service inputs, such as advertising and salespeople. The contracts also imposed quantity floors, a practice already in use before the regulatory change. The introduction of standards suggests that, consistent with a view of vertical restraints as coordination mechanisms, manufacturers used exclusive territories to induce desired dealer services and, once prohibited, switched to alternative contractual devices to achieve this goal. The introduction of price ceilings despite free intrabrand competition also suggests car manufacturers tried to prevent some dealers from "gaming" the quantity floors by selling to other dealers' customers, while charging monopolistic prices at their own location.
October 15, 2008 | Permalink
TrackBack URL for this entry:
Listed below are links to weblogs that reference Vertical Restraints and the Law: Evidence from Automobile Franchising: