Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

Tuesday, October 14, 2008

Deterrence in Competition Policy

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

The 16th WZB Conference on Markets and Politics and the 2nd Conference of the Research Network on Innovation and Competition Policy (RNIC)

Deterrence in Competition Policy

Draft Program

Friday, October 17, 2008

13:00 – 14:00 Registration and Welcome

Session I: Dynamic and Efficiency Effects of Competition Policy

14:00 – 14:45 Dynamic Merger Review
* Volker Nocke (Oxford University and CEPR)
Michael Whinston (Northwestern University and NBER)
Discussant: Pedro Pita Barros (Universidade Nova de Lisboa and CEPR)

14:45 – 15:30 Competition Policy and Productivity Growth: An Empirical Analysis
Paolo Buccirossi (LEAR)
* Tomaso Duso (Humboldt University and WZB)
Lorenzo Ciari (European University Institute)
Giancarlo Spagnolo (Univ. of Rome Tor Vergata, Stockholm School of Economics and CEPR)
Cristiana Vitale (LEAR)
Discussant: Klaus Gugler (University of Vienna)

15:30 – 16:00 Coffee break

Session II: Deterrence Effects of Merger Policy

16:00 – 16:45 Optimal Merger Policy
Lars Sørgard (Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration)
Discussant: Albert Banal-Estañol (City University London and Universitat Pompeu Fabra)

16:45 – 17:30 Deterrence of Horizontal Mergers: Empirical Evidence from U.S. industries
* Joe Clougherty (WZB and CEPR)
Jo Seldeslachts (WZB)
Discussant: Maarten-Pieter Schinkel (University of Amsterdam)

17:30 – 18:00 Coffee break

Session III: Keynote Lecture

18:00 – 19:00 The Impact of Corporate Leniency on Cartel Formation in a Model of Endogenous
Antitrust Enforcement
Joseph Harrington (John Hopkins University)
Discussant: Yossi Spiegel (University of Tel Aviv and CEPR)

19:30 Conference Dinner, sponsored by the ESMT (European School of Management and

Saturday, October 18, 2008

Session IV: Costs and Benefits of Judicial Actions

10:00 – 10:45 Judicial Errors and Innovative Activity
* Giovanni Immordino (University of Salerno and CSEF)
Michele Polo (Bocconi University)
Discussant: Roland Strausz (Humboldt University)

10:45 – 11:30 The Incapacitation Effect of Incarceration: Evidence From Several Italian Collective
Alessandro Barbarino (Federal Reserve Board, Washington)
* Giovanni Mastrobuoni (Collegio Carlo Alberto)
Discussant: Daniel Cerquera (ZEW)

11:30 – 13:00 Lunch break

Session V: Deterrence Effects of Private Enforcement and Criminal Law

13:00 – 13:45 The Scope of Criminal Law and Criminal Sanctions: An Economic View and Policy
* Roger Bowles (University of York)
Michael Faure (University of Maastricht)
Nuno Garoupa (University of Illinois and IMDEA)
Discussant: Maurice Stucke (University of Tennessee and American Antitrust Institute)

13:45 – 14:30 Antitrust Privatisation or Criminalisation – Should we Bankrupt or Hang Price-Fixers?
Florian Wagner-von Papp (University College London)
Discussant: Daniel Zimmer (University of Bonn)

14:30 – 15:00 Coffee break

Session VI: Experimental Evidence on Deterrence

15:00 – 15:45 From Overt to Tacit Collusion: Experimental Evidence on the Adverse Effects of
Corporate Leniency Programs
Jeroen Hinloopen (University of Amsterdam and KU Leuven)
* Adriaan Soetevent (University of Amsterdam)
Discussant: Wieland Müller (Tilburg University)

15:45 – 16:30 Risk Aversion, Prospect Theory, and Strategic Risk in Law Enforcement: Evidence from
an Antitrust Experiment
Maria Bigoni (University of Padua)
Sven-Olof Fridolfsson (Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Stockholm)
Chloe Le Coq (Stockholm School of Economics)
* Giancarlo Spagnolo (Univ. of Rome Tor Vergata, Stockholm School of Economics and CEPR)
Discussant: Debrah Meloso (Bocconi University)

16:30 – 17:00 Closing Remarks
Lars-Hendrik Röller (ESMT, WZB and Humboldt University)

19:00 Informal Dinner
Jo Seldeslachts (WZB)
Tomaso Duso (Humboldt University and WZB)
Lars-Hendrik Röller (ESMT, WZB and CEPR)

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