Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

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Friday, August 29, 2008

Optimal Corporate Leniency Programs

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Joseph E. Harrington, Johns Hopkins University - Department of Economics has a very interesting piece on Optimal Corporate Leniency Programs.

ABSTRACT: This study characterizes the corporate leniency policy that minimizes the frequency with which collusion occurs. Though it can be optimal to provide only partial leniency, plausible sufficient conditions are provided whereby the antitrust authority should waive all penalties for the first firm to come forward. It is also shown that restrictions should be placed on when amnesty is awarded, though it can be optimal to award amnesty even when the antitrust authority is very likely to win the case without insider testimony.

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2008/08/optimal-corpora.html

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