Bertrand-Edgeworth Equilibrium in Oligopoly

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Daisuke Hirata (Graduate School of Economics, The University of Tokyo) has written on Bertrand-Edgeworth Equilibrium in Oligopoly. 

ABSTRACT: This paper investigates a simultaneous move capacity constrained price competition game among three firms. I find that equilibria in an asymmetric oligopoly are substantially different from those in a duopoly and symmetric oligopoly. I characterize mixed strategy equilibria and show there exist possibilities of i) the existence of a continuum of equilibria ii) the smallest firm earning the largest profit per capacity and iii) non-identical supports of equilibrium mixed strategies, all of which never arise either in the duopoly or in the symmetric oligopoly. In particular, the second finding sheds light on a completely new pricing incentive in Bertrand competitions.