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March 31, 2008
The Implementation of the European Commission's Merger Regulation 2004: An Empirical Analysis
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Borja Martinez Fernández (Staffordshire University), Iraj Hashi (Staffordshire University) and Marc Jegers (Vrije Universiteit Brussel) present some interesting findings in their article The Implementation of the European Commission's Merger Regulation 2004: An Empirical Analysis.
ABSTRACT: The factors influencing the European Commission's decisions under the 2004 Merger Regulation are assessed on a sample of 50 cases. Probit analysis results in the finding that the probability of nonclearance in phase I of the procedure is significantly affected by the estimated market share increase due to the proposed merger, the contestability of the market, and the presence of barriers to entry. Furthermore, there is some evidence that the Commission's decisions are biased against market leaders involved in proposed mergers.
March 31, 2008 | Permalink
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