Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

A Member of the Law Professor Blogs Network

Friday, March 7, 2008

Supranational Agency: A Solution for Conflict in International Mergers?

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Poonam Mehra of the University of Hamburg - Institute of Law and Economics develops a theoretical model to suggest transfer payments across countries in international antitrust merger control in Supranational Agency: A Solution for Conflict in International Mergers?

ABSTRACT: Conflict between national antitrust or competition laws is likely to increase with the increase in global integration. In this paper we develop a two-country, three-firm model to analyze the possibilities of conflict between national antitrust authorities, using the welfare criteria. We show that if countries maximize their national welfare there is a likelihood of conflict resulting at times in obstruction of welfare-enhancing mergers. We show that shifting to either a global welfare or consumer surplus standard can resolve conflicts but may not always lead to an efficient outcome. To achieve efficiency, transfer payments are required. We argue that there is a scope for institutions like WTO to assume the role of supranational authority in cross border merger cases.

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2008/03/supranational-a.html

| Permalink

TrackBack URL for this entry:

http://www.typepad.com/services/trackback/6a00d8341bfae553ef00e550c836528834

Listed below are links to weblogs that reference Supranational Agency: A Solution for Conflict in International Mergers? :

Comments

Post a comment