Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog

Editor: D. Daniel Sokol
University of Florida
Levin College of Law

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Monday, February 4, 2008

Triggering Inspections Ex Officio: Moving Beyond a Passive EU Cartel Policy

Posted by D. Daniel Sokol

Hans W. Friederiszick and Frank P. Maier-Rigaud provide us a normative assessment of EU cartel policy in Triggering Inspections Ex Officio: Moving Beyond a Passive EU Cartel Policy.

ABSTRACT: The implementation of leniency programs is considered a success both at EU Community level and in individual member states. The paper discusses the value of ex officio investigations for cartel detection in light of leniency and complaint-based cases. Are ex officio investigations still needed? Should a competition authority concentrate its scarce resources exclusively on the prosecution of leniency or complaint-based cases or follow a proactive market monitoring policy? It is argued that investigations triggered ex officio are an important complementary enforcement tool to the other passive instruments available to a competition authority. A bottom-up methodology for triggering inspections based on economic criteria is presented allowing for a more proactive cartel policy.

http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/antitrustprof_blog/2008/02/triggering-insp.html

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