December 27, 2007
The Political Economy of Antitrust
Posted by D. Daniel Sokol
Chapter 1: Issues in Antitrust Enforcement, Vivek Ghosal (Georgia Institute of Technology), Joseph Harrington (Johns Hopkins University) and Johan Stennek (Research Institute for Industrial Economics, Stockholm). Chapter 2: Remembrance of Things Past: Antitrust, Ideology, and the Development of Industrial Economics. Stephen Martin (Purdue University). Chapter 3: The Impact of the Corporate Leniency Program on Cartel Formation and the Cartel Price Path. Joe Chen (University of Tokyo) and Joseph Harrington (Johns Hopkins University). Chapter 4: Optimal Fines in the Era of Whistleblowers: Should Price Fixers Still go to Prison Paolo Buccirossi (Laboratory of Economics, Antitrust and Regulation, Rome) and Giancarlo Spagnolo (Stockholm School of Economics). Chapter 5: Instruments for Cartel Deterrence, and Conflicts of Interests. Cecile Aubert (Universite Paris IX Dauphine). Chapter 6: Lessons for Competition Policy from the Vitamins Cartel. William Kovacic (George Washington University), Robert Marshall (Pennsylvania State University), Leslie Marx (Duke University) and Matthew Raiff (Bates White). Chapter 7: Effectiveness of Antitrust Sanctions on Modern International Cartels John Connor (Purdue University). Chapter 8: The Economics of Tacit Collusion in Merger Analysis. Marc Ivaldi, Bruno Jullien, Patrick Rey, Paul Seabright and Jean Tirole (University of Toulouse). Chapter 9: The Economics and Politics of International Merger Enforcement: A Case Study of the GE/Honeywell Merger. Jay Pil Choi (Michigan State University). Chapter 10: The Political Economy of EU Merger Control: Small versus Large Member State Interests. Henrik Horn (Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm) and Johan Stennek (Research Institute for Industrial Economics, Stockholm). Chapter 11: A Consumers Surplus Defense in Merger Control. Sven-Olof Fridolfsson (Research Institute for Industrial Economics, Stockholm). Chapter 12: EU Merger Remedies: A Preliminary Empirical Assessment. Tomaso Duso (Humboldt University and WZB), Klaus Gugler (University of Vienna) and Burcin Yurtoglu (University of Vienna). Chapter 13: The Significant Impediment of Effective Competition Test in the New European Merger Regulation: In Theory and Practice. Jerome Foncel (GREMARS, University of Lille), Marc Ivaldi (University of Toulouse) and Valerie Rabassa (DG Competition, European Commission). Chapter 14: Vertical Restraints and the Effects of Upstream Horizontal Mergers. Luke Froeb (Vanderbilt University), Steven Schantz (Vanderbilt University) and Gregory Werden (U.S. Department of Justice). Chapter 15: Political Stabilization by an Independent Regulator. Antoine Faure-Grimaud (London School of Economics) and David Martimort (University of Toulouse). Chapter 16: Saving Section 2: Reframing U.S. Monopolization Law. Timothy Brennan (University of Maryland, Baltimore). Chapter 17: Private Antitrust Litigation: Procompetitive or Anticompetitive Preston McAfee (California Institute of Technology), Hugo Mialon (Emory University) and Sue Mialon (University of North Dakota). Chapter 18: Antitrust in Open Economies. Joseph Francois (Tinbergen Institute) Henrik Horn (Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm).
December 27, 2007 | Permalink
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