Adjunct Law Prof Blog

Editor: Mitchell H. Rubinstein
New York Law School

Wednesday, October 12, 2011

7th holds Federal appellate court holds school district did not violate Establishment Clause by conducting graduation ceremonies at local church

Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist.
, No. 10-2922 (7th Cir. Sept. 9, 2011), is an interesting case. In a 2-1 split, the Seventh Circuit held that a school district did not violate the Establishment Clause when it held graduation ceremonies at a local Christian church.  Although the district court had relied on the coercion test and the primary effect prong of the the test enunciated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), the majority determined that the coercion test was not an appropriate analysis here because the challenged activity is not a religious exercise. Instead, it analyzed the school district’s actions under the Lemon test.

Mitchell H. Rubinstein


October 12, 2011 in Education Law, First Amendment | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, October 3, 2011

School administrators did not violate a student’s Constitutional right to “free speech” when it disciplined her for harassing a fellow student via after-school posting on the Internet


Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools, United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, Docket #10-1098
A student sued West Virginia’s Berkeley County School District contending that it had violated her Constitutional right to free speech when it suspended her for creating a MySpace page ridiculing a fellow student. A federal District Court judge granted the school district’s motion for summary judgment, which ruling was affirmed by the Fourth Circuit U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals.
In this 42 USC 1983 action the court found that the student’s after-school “conduct was sufficiently connected to the school environment so as to implicate the [district’s] recognized authority to discipline speech which materially and substantially interferes with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school and collides with the rights of others.”
The full text of the decision is posted on the Internet at:
Reprinted with permission New York Public Personnel Law
Mitchell H. Rubinstein


October 3, 2011 in Education Law, First Amendment | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, August 30, 2011

Federal district court concludes former principal was not speaking as private citizen when she reported predecessor’s financial and administrative irregularities

McArdle v. Peoria Sch. Dist. No. 150, ___F. Supp. 2d____ (C.D. Ill. Jun.7, 2010), is an interesting case. A federal district court granted a school district summary judgment on a former principal’s claim that she was terminated in retaliation for exercising her First Amendment rights. The court concluded that the principal’s speech was not protected by the First Amendment because she spoke pursuant to her official duties.

The district court also ruled that even if the principal had spoken as a private citizen, her speech was not entitled to First Amendment protection because it was not on a matter of public concern, but rather involved a personal grievance. 

I bring this case to your attention because it reviews standard First Amendment principles.

Mitchell H. Rubinstein


August 30, 2011 in Education Law, First Amendment | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, July 31, 2011

Bus Driver Fired For Displaying Confederate Flag Looses Case

Webber v. First Student, Inc.,____F. Supp. 2d_____(D. Or. Jul. 12, 2011), is an interesting case that attracted media attention.  A federal district court magistrate in Oregon held that a bus driver who was employed by a private contractor that provides transportation services for a school district failed to state a valid retaliation claim under the federal constitution’s Equal Protection Clause based his discharge after refusing to remove to a Confederate flag from display on his personal vehicle while parked in the contractor’s lot. 

The magistrate also recommended that the former employee’s claim based on the state constitution’s equal protection clause be dismissed with prejudice. Significantly, however, he held that the driver’s retaliation claim based on the state constitution’s free speech provision was valid and granted leave to amend. Interestingly, plaintiff did not plead a First Amendment claim under the First Amendment, probably because it may not pass the public concern standard. A media clip about this case is available below.



July 31, 2011 in Education Law, First Amendment | Permalink | Comments (0)

Sunday, July 17, 2011

2d Circuit Issues Important Student First Amendment Decision

Ro v. Ithaca City School District, ____F.3d____ (2d Cir. May 18, 2011), is an interesting case. In a well written decision, the Second Circuit holds that a school district did not violate the First Amendment rights of students by its prohibition of a sexually explicit cartoon from appearing in a school newspaper. Under Bethel v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986), the 2d reasoned that school districts have wide discretion to restrict lewd, indecent or offensive speech.

Mitchell H. Rubinstein 

July 17, 2011 in Education Law, First Amendment | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, July 12, 2011

School bus driver suspended over display of Confederate flag on personal vehicle

Reportedly, a school bus driver in Oregon has been suspended after refusing to remove a Confederate flag from the antenna of his personal vehicle. The employee, who is employed by First Student Inc., which contracts buses for the Phoenix-Talent School District, had been driving the kindergarten bus. When the Superintendent saw the flag on the employee's truck parked at the school bus yard, he told the employee's supervisor that the flag had to go, or tha the employee had to go. The school district owns the bus yard and leases it to First Student.

Source: KOMO 4 News, 3/3/11, By Jeff Barnard (AP)


July 12, 2011 in Education Law, First Amendment | Permalink | Comments (3)

Thursday, April 28, 2011

DOJ files suit on behalf of Muslim teacher against Illinois school over denial of leave of absence to attend religious pilgrimage

Reportedly, the U.S.  Department Department of Justice has filed suit against Berkeley School District 87 alleging it violated a Muslim teacher’s rights under the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 by failing to reasonably accommodate her religious practices. It is alleged that the District, denied the teacher's request to take  unpaid leave to make a pilgrimage to Mecca, which is a central part of her religion, on grounds that her requested leave was unrelated to her professional duties and was not set forth in the contract between the school district and the teachers’ union. After the district twice denied her request, Khan wrote the board that “based on her religious beliefs, she could not justify delaying performing hajj,” and resigned shortly thereafter.

It will be interesting to see how the court rules. 

Source: NPR, 12/13/10, By Associated Press

Mitchell H. Rubinstein

April 28, 2011 in Education Law, First Amendment | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, April 25, 2011

2d Circuit Issues Important Decision on Student First A Rights and Section1983


Donninger v. Niehoff, ___F.3d___(2d Cir. April 25, 2011), Download Donninger II is an interesting case. It concerns the First Amendment rights of secondary students to post a blog crticial of her school and to wear a tee shirt crticial of the administration.  

This decision, which is 37 pages long, actually never reaches the central issue, namely whether a student can be disciplined for a blog entry. This was because the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The First Amendment right at issue was not clearly established at the time of the incident.

The case is an excellent primer on the First Amendment rights of students and on 1983 qualified immunity.  

This is actually the 2d time that the case reached the circuit. Look for a cert petition to be filed. 

Mitchell H. Rubinstein

April 25, 2011 in Education Law, First Amendment | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, April 11, 2011

4th Circuit Holds Garcetti Does Not Apply To Public Universities


Adams v. Trustees of the Univ. of North Carolina-Wilmington, ___F.3d___ (4th Cir. April 6, 2011) is an important First Amendment case, particularly in higher education. 

Readers will recall that the Supreme Court in Garcetti further narrowed the First Amendment rights of public employees by drawing a distinction with respect to speech which was part of an employees job and purely private speech, with the only the later being constitutionally protected. Garcetti, however, also stated that the Court expressed no opinion whether that holding applied with respect to academic freedom issues because academic freedom is a special concern of the First Amendment. 

Now the 4th Circuit has spoken on this issue and held that Garcetti does not apply in the context of academic freedom. The plaintiff professor still has to meeting the public concern test as well as the Pickering balancing test, but he or she does not bear the additional burden under Garcetti of possibly facing dismissal if the speech was concerning the individuals employment. 

I agree with Professor Secunda over at Workplace Prof Blog who indicated that this case may be headed to the Supremes.

Mitchell H. Rubinstein 

April 11, 2011 in College Professors, First Amendment, Public Sector Employment Law | Permalink | Comments (0)

Wednesday, March 2, 2011

What Does Snyder Mean For First Amendment Employment Law

In case you have been under a bus, earlier today the Supreme Court decided Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S.___(March 2, 2011). In a 6-1 well written opinion, the Court held that picketing at a miltary war hero's funeral was constitutionally protected under the First Amendment. My point here is not to debate the merits of that decision. Rather, it is to discuss what effect, if any, this decision might have on public employee First Amendment jurisprudence. I believe that this decision is very significant. 

Public employee First Amendment jurisprudence has been centered on the public concern test. If something was not a matter of public concern, then there would be no First Amendment protection. Here, the Court left the door open to the fact that certain types of speech of private concern very well may be protected. As the Court explained on pages 6-7:

“ ‘[N]ot all speech is  of equal First Amendment importance,’ ” however, and where matters of purely private significance are at issue, First Amendment protections are often less rigorous.  Hustler, supra, at 56 (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, supra, at 758); see Connick, supra, at 145–147. That is because restricting speech on purely private matters does not implicate the same constitutional concerns as limiting speech on matters of public interest: “[T]here isno threat to the free and robust debate of public issues;there is no potential interference with a meaningful dialogue of ideas”; and the “threat of liability” does not posethe risk of “a reaction of self-censorship” on matters ofpublic import.  Dun & Bradstreet, supra, at 760 (internal quotation marks omitted). We noted  a short time ago, in considering whether public employee speech addressed a matter of public concern, that “the boundaries of the public concern test arenot well defined.”  San Diego v.  Roe, 543 U. S. 77, 83 (2004) (per curiam).  Although that remains true today, wehave articulated some guiding principles, principles that accord broad protection to speech to ensure that courts themselves do not become inadverent censors.

Quite simply, private concerns being of less significance is quite a different matter from them not having any constitutional protection. It, of course, remains to be seen what type of private matter, if any, would be entitled to constittutional protection. 

Law review commentary on this important issue would be most welcome.

Mitchell H. Rubinstein

March 2, 2011 in Employment Law, First Amendment, Law Review Ideas | Permalink | Comments (1)

Saturday, October 23, 2010

Does Juan Williams Have A First Amendment Case?

NPR appears to be a public employer because it is funded, at least in part, by the federal government. Query whether Mr. Williams has a First Amendment case to challenge his discharge? He was speaking on his own time not as an employee, but as a citizen. He also was discussing a matter of public concern. Under Garcetti and Pickering it appears to me that he may have been terminated for engaging protected speech.

But, and this is a big BUT, he may have been covered by an employment contract that may have limited what he could say or otherwise defined his terms and conditions of employment. An interesting legal issue would be whether such a contract could be found void as violative of the First Amendment. 

Of course, Juan Williams, who is one of my favorite journalists (even though I often disagree with his politics) is likely to make out like a bandit. Meaning, he may actually make more money with an increased role at Fox News as well as at other networks. Therefore, he probably does not have any damages. This makes a lawsuit unlikely. 

However, it would make a nice law school hypo on an exam!

Mitchell H. Rubinstein

October 23, 2010 in Employment Law, First Amendment | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, September 23, 2010

Teacher failed to state valid First Amendment retaliation claim based on filing a lawsuit on behalf of daughter against school district


Vereecke v. Huron Valley Sch. Dist., ___F.3d___ (6th Cir. Jun. 18, 2010), is an interesting case. The 6th held a teacher failed to state a valid claim under the First Amendment for retaliation based on his filing of a lawsuit on behalf of his daughter against the school district. The teacher failed to establish a causal connection between filing the suit and his removal as athletic coordinator. The court concluded that the temporary proximity of filing the lawsuit to the adverse employment action of removal from the athletic coordinator position alone was insufficient to create the inference of causation.

Mitchell H. Rubinstein

September 23, 2010 in Education Law, First Amendment | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, September 7, 2010

University librarian’s recommendation of controversial book for required reading list was not protected speech in First Amendment retaliation, constructive discharge suit

Savage v Gee, ___F.Supp.2d____(S.D.Ohio, June 7, 2010), is an interesting case. A “conservative” Quaker head reference librarian at a university, who was part of a committee charged with selecting a book for required freshman reading, was unable to pursue his First Amendment retaliation claim against because he did not engage in protected speech when he recommended the controversial book.  Because the chapter of the book concerning homosexuality raised issues of public concern, and since the record demonstrated that the controversy expanded beyond the committee, and became public, the librarian’s suggestion to require the book met the public concern prerequisite to First Amendment claims, held the court. To determine whether the librarian was “speaking as a citizen,” the court followed the analysis of Garcetti v Ceballos to find the librarian made his recommendation for the reading list pursuant to his official duties and that his speech was not protected. Recognizing that some circuits have recognized an “academic freedom” exception to the Garcetti doctrine, but that the Sixth Circuit had not yet ruled on this issue, the district court ruled that, even if such an exception exists, it did not apply in this case because the librarian’s recommendation of a book for a book list did not concern “scholarship or teaching,” as it was made pursuant to an assignment to a faculty committee.

Law review commentary of the scope of the academic freedom exemption would be welcome.

Mitchell H. Rubinstein

September 7, 2010 in First Amendment, Law Review Ideas | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, August 17, 2010

Union awarded $165,000.50: fifty cents in damages plus $165,000 for attorney fees

Local 32B-32J, SEIU v Port Authority, USDC SDNY 96 CIV 1438

Although Locals 32B and 32J won only fifty cents in damages after refusing a settlement offer of $50,000, they were awarded attorney fees and court costs totaling more than $165,000.

Why? Because the unions were the “prevailing parties” in their challenge to picketing restrictions imposed on them by the New York-New Jersey Port Authority. The unions contended that these restrictions constituted unlawful restrictions on their right to free speech.

Reprinted with permission New York Public Personnel Law

Mitchell H. Rubinstein

August 17, 2010 in First Amendment, Unions | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, August 5, 2010

Univ. of Illinois Adjunct Prof. Reinstated After He Was Terminated Because of His Religious Beliefs

Fox News reported, here, that the University of Illinois reinstated an adjunct college professor who reportedly was terminating for stating that he agreed with the church's teaching that homosexual sex is immoral. Query whether this professor had a valid First Amendment claim under Garcetti and Pickering.

Mitchell H. Rubinstein

August 5, 2010 in Adjuncts in the News, First Amendment | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, May 13, 2010

Police chief held to have qualified immunity with respect to First Amendment violation allegations


Gubitosi v. Kapica, CA2, 154 F.3d 30

After a local newspaper reported that Police Officer Lori Gubitosi of the Town of Greenburgh was a lesbian, Gubitosi became reluctant to perform strip searches on female prisoners. She feared charges of improper sexual conduct or a civil rights suit.

The problem came to a head on May 31, 1994, when she refused to obey her superior officer’s order to perform a strip search of a female prisoner. This resulted in Gubitosi’s agreeing to the forfeiture of five days’ pay as an “administrative penalty,” and waived her right to a disciplinary hearing.

The following month Gubitosi received two separate personnel evaluation reports criticizing her job performance. In response, she submitted two memoranda objecting to various police practices on June 28, 1994.

The practices criticized by Gubitosi included allegations that police officers (1) attended “bagel parties” and birthday parties when they should have been performing police work at their assigned posts; (2) abandoned their patrol duties to take extended breaks at firehouses; and (3) drank and used obscene language while off-duty.

On July 22, 1994, Gubitosi was ordered by a superior officer to strip search three female detainees. Although she reported to her superior that she had done so, a subsequent search revealed contraband in the brassiere of one of the detainees. As a result of Chief John A. Kapica’s investigation, Gubitosi was suspended and disciplinary charges were filed against her, including allegations that she disobeyed a lawful order, failed to perform a lawful duty and knowingly made a false report. Found guilty, Gubitosi was dismissed from the force.

According to the decision, Chief Kapica had interviewed Gubitosi, who maintained -- both in the interview and in her written statement -- that she had strip searched the women. The disciplinary hearings were held between December 1994 and June 1995 under the Westchester County Police Act Sections 7 and 8 [Chapter 104 of the Laws of 1936, as amended]. Gubitosi was represented by an attorney but she did not testify.

Gubitosi sued, contending that her civil rights and her rights to free speech and due process had been violated by Chief Kapica, among others. She alleged that she was fired in retaliation for her criticisms of police practices.

Chief Kapica claimed he was entitled to qualified immunity because he lodged the charges against Gubitosi because of her insubordination and not because of her complaints regarding police practices, and that Gubitosi offered no affirmative evidence to counter the Chief’s assertion that he “didn’t retaliate.” Although a federal District Court justice decided that Chief Kapica was not entitled to a qualified immunity with respect to Gubitosi’s free speech claims, this ruling was reversed by the U.S. Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit.

While Gubitosi argued that the short period of time between the date she submitted her criticisms and the date she was served with disciplinary charges constituted evidence of retaliation, the Circuit panel said that “it is simply impossible to miss the significant intervening events between these two dates, events corroborated by written statements and testimony given by fellow police officers and the three female detainees: plaintiff disobeyed the order to perform the strip searches, lied about it in the post-offense interview, and gave a false written statement about it.”

Finding that “the total absence of evidence of retaliation offered by [Gubitosi] is fatal to her case,” the Court ruled that Chief Kapica was entitled to a qualified immunity with respect to Gubitosi’s First Amendment claims. According to the Court, “[e]ven if we assume all the facts in the record “that the trial judge [would have] concluded the jury might find in plaintiff’s favor ..., we conclude that [Gubitosi] has failed to identify affirmative evidence showing that Kapica retaliated against her for the exercise of her First Amendment rights. As a result, his qualified immunity defense is established as a matter of law.”

Reprinted with permission New York Public Personnel Law

Mitchell H. Rubinstein

May 13, 2010 in First Amendment | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, April 19, 2010

N.J. Teacher suspended for engaging in union activities stated valid First Amendment retaliation claim

Cowan v. Board of Educ. of the Borough of Carteret, ___F.Supp.2d___ (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 2010), is an interesting federal district court case from New Jersey. The court held that a teacher, suspended with pay for putting a pro-union essay in the mailboxes of three teachers who crossed a picket line, stated a valid First Amendment claim for retaliation. The court, however, dismissed the teacher’s two other retaliation claims based on qualified immunity.

Robert Cowan, a teacher also served as president of the Carteret Education Association (CEA). At the time he was first elected president of the union, school provided him with a work schedule that included three consecutive non-duty periods during which he could engage in union activities. After the CEA negotiated a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the Borough of Carteret Board of Education (BCBOE) in 2005, Cowan became involved in a union-related incident with board members and an altercation with another teacher. In 2006, the new principal changed Cowan’s schedule, requiring him to teach classes in a subject he had never taught before, but was certified to teach. Although the new schedule included a period for union activity, he no longer had three consecutive non-duty periods. Cowan filed a grievance regarding the schedule, which the principal denied. The teacher altercation was investigated by an assistant superintendent, who noted in her report that Cowan had left his classroom unattended for 10 minutes. After his grievance was denied, Cowan filed suit against Board and a number of school district officials. He alleged that his schedule change and new subject assignment were adverse employment actions in response to his union activities.

Cowan alleged that shortly after the suit was filed, the superintendent took further retaliatory action against him. Specifically, the superintendent charged Cowan with leaving his class unsupervised during the altercation with the other teacher, and suspended him with pay. The board upheld the suspension.  Cowan also organized a “legal job action” that involved teacher picketing before school hours. After three CEA members refused to participate in the picketing, Cowan placed copies of Jack London’s essay, “The Scab,” into their school mailboxes. The essay condemns workers who refuse to honor strikes. When the superintendent questioned Cowan, he denied placing “letters” in the teachers’ mailboxes. Surveillance video, however, showed him putting the essays in the boxes. As a result, Cowan was charged with violating BCBOE policy prohibiting teachers from engaging in union activity in the presence of students while on school property. He received a one week suspension with pay. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment based on lack of adverse employment action with respect to the schedule change, and qualified immunity on all counts.

The Court began by examining Cowan’s claim that his schedule change constituted an adverse employment action in retaliation for his union activities. It pointed out that Cowan conceded that schedule did not violate the CBA because he still had a free period to conduct CEA business. It also noted that he was certified to teach the new subject he was assigned; while teaching might require addition preparation time, there was no evidence that the assignment prevented him from exercising his First Amendment right to engage in union activities. It emphasized that the defendants, as public officials, were entitled to qualified immunity unless: (1) their conduct violated a constitutional right; and (2) that right was clearly established at the time violation occurred. The district court concluded: “Altering a schedule is clearly within the discretionary functions of the principal, and there is no evidence that a reasonable person in [the principal’s] position would believe that altering a teacher’s schedule and subjects taught would violate a clearly established right held by [Cowan].” It, therefore, found defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.

The district court again found the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on Cowan’s claim that his suspension for leaving his classroom unsupervised constituted an adverse employment action in retaliation for his protected union activities.

The district court found that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity on Cowen’s claim of retaliation for distributing “The Scab” essay. It found that the distribution constituted protected speech. It pointed out that there was an ongoing labor dispute and Cowan was alleging the superintendent disciplined him because of his involvement in the union. It stated that it was “reasonable to believe that [the superintendent] and the Board were aware that a suspension for union activity or for distribution of a political essay to fellow colleagues may implicate his First Amendment right of association.” Under the balancing test established in Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Township High School Dist. 205, Will Cty., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968), it was a question of fact for the jury to “determine whether the disciplinary charge was in retaliation for the union work action or whether it was a legitimate charge based on the facts.”

Mitchell H. Rubinstein

April 19, 2010 in Education Law, First Amendment | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, February 15, 2010

Grievance over failure to discipline student was not citizen speech under First A


Weintraub v Bd of Educ, City of New York, January 27, 2010), is an important First Amendment case which demonstrates how narrow public employee free speech rights actually are. The 2d Circuit held that a public school teacher was acting pursuant to his official duties and was not engaged in speech as a private citizen when he filed a grievance with his union after an assistant principal declined to discipline a student who threw books at the teacher during class.  Under the Supreme Court's decision in Garcetti, the teacher's grievance was not protected speech because it was part-and-parcel about his ability to properly execute his duties, namely, to maintain classroom discipline. The 2d basically concluded that the teacher's speech was a means to fulfill this primary employment responsibility. Judge Calabresi dissented.

Mitchell H. Rubinstein

February 15, 2010 in First Amendment | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, February 1, 2010

Will Citizens United Kill Judicial Elections?

Tony Mauro, National Law Journal, writes today to ask whether the United States Supreme Court's recent controversial decision in Citizens United v. F.E.C. and the increased corporate money that may flow to judicial campaigns as a result will positively impact on the national movement to replace state judicial elections systems with a merit selection and retention process.

I have not digested the lengthy Citizens United decision, concurrences and dissent yet and for that reason, if none other, will not opine how the decision may affect judicial elections going forward.  Judicial selection reformers argue that allowing corporations, including possibly foreign or foreign-controlled corporations, unfettered access to the American political process through unlimited donations, may turn public support against judicial elections, where large contributions by corporation toward judicial campaigns are often disapproved. 

Mauro's article on the case's possible impact on the judicial selection reform movement is very informative, regardless your point of view on Citizen United's merits, and is recommended.

Craig Estlinbaum

February 1, 2010 in Constitutional Law, First Amendment, Judges | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, October 1, 2009

Speech Made As Part of Your Job Is Unprotected Under First Amendment


n a brief per curiam decision, the Eighth Circuit ruled that Omaha Public Schools (OPS) did not retaliate against a former employee for exercising his free speech rights when it terminated him. The court concluded that his speech was not protected by the First Amendment because it was made within the course of his duties. The plaintiff was the coordinator of technical support for OPS’s information management services department. He reported possible pay irregularities, invalid service contracts, and a discrepancy in budgetary funds to other OPS staff members. The 8th held that that this speech was unprotected because “Anderson admitted in his deposition testimony that in each instance the speech was made in the course of his duties.” The court cited Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006), along with two Eighth Circuit cases, in support of the proposition that “no First Amendment protection arises if employee speaks upon matters only of personal interest, or speaks on matter of public concern in course of duties as government employee.”

Anderson v. Douglas County Sch. Dist. 0001, No. 8-1682 (8th Cir. Aug. 14, 2009). Once again, this case demonstrates how narrow public employee free speech rights are.

Mitchell H. Rubinstein

October 1, 2009 in First Amendment | Permalink | Comments (0) | TrackBack (0)