Adjunct Law Prof Blog

Reinstatement of School Bus Driver Who Tested Positive For Pot Does Not Violate Public Policy

The NY Court of Appeals recently issued an important decision concerning public policy and arbitration. The Court holds that an arbitrator's award reinstating a teacher who tested positive for pot did not violate public policy. The Court reasoned:

We have recognized "three narrow grounds that may form the basis for vacating an arbitrator's award — that it violates public policy, is irrational, or clearly exceeds a specifically enumerated limitation on the arbitrator's power" (Matter of New York City Tr. Auth. v Transport Workers Union of Am., Local 100, 14 NY3d 119, 123 [2010] [citations and internal quotation marks omitted]). None of these grounds has been established here.

The arbitrator's decision did not exceed a specific limitation on his power; nor was it irrational. Rather, he determined that, contrary to the School District's argument, the parties' agreement did not require the penalty of termination in these circumstances and that the District did not in fact have a zero tolerance policy. The consequent determination that reinstatement with conditions was the appropriate penalty did not violate public policy (see Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v Mine Workers, 531 US 57 [2000]). "That reasonable minds might disagree over what the proper penalty should have been does not provide a basis for vacating the arbitral award or refashioning the penalty" (City School Dist. of the City of N.Y. v McGraham, 17 NY3d 917, 920 [2011]). 

The decision is Sehnedehowa Central School Dist. v. CSEA, 2013 NY Slip Op. 0085 (Feb. 12, 2013),  Download Matter of Shenendehowa Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. (Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Local 864) (2013 NY Slip Op 00885)

 

Mitchell H. Rubinstein

20 Day Suspension For Tieing A Noose Does Not Violate Public Policy

An arbitrator's decision to reinstate with a 20-day suspension a Port of Seattle employee who was fired for hanging a noose in the workplace did not violate Washington public policy against employment discrimination, a unanimous state supreme court holds. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs Local 286 v. Port of Seattle, (Wash., No. 86739-9, 2/21/13).

Failing to comply with the notice requirements for filing a demand for arbitration set out in the collective bargaining agreement is a fatal procedural defect

In the Matter of the Arbitration between Livingston County and the Livingston County Civil Serv. Employees Assn., Inc., Local 1000, 2012 NY Slip Op 08985, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

The County and Local 1000 of the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc. were involved in a grievance that was at the various steps set out in the CBA’s contract grievance procedure article. Ultimately the County denied the grievance by a written decision dated October 4, 2011. CSEA then advised the County by a letter dated October 27, 2011 that it intended to submit the grievance to arbitration. The County received CSEA’s letter on October 28, 2011.

The critical provision in the CBA central to this litigation required "[c]ompliance with the time limits for submitting a notice of intent to arbitrate [and such compliance] shall be a condition precedent to arbitration". The CBA also included a provision stating that "Failure to submit a notice of intent to submit a grievance to arbitration . . . shall thus bar the grievance from proceeding to arbitration."

The time limits set out in the CBA required that the party demanding arbitration must notify the other party of its intention to submit the matter to arbitration “no later than 15 working days after a written decision was issued at the second step of the grievance process.”

Livingston County asked Supreme Court to stay arbitration, contending that CSEA’s demand to submit the grievance to arbitration was untimely as it had not been notified of CSEA’s intent to do so within 15 working days of date of its denial of the grievance.

Supreme Court denied the County’s petition; the Appellate Division unanimously reversed the lower court ruling “on the law.”

The Appellate Division explained that although the CBA between the parties sets out a “broad arbitration agreement,” it also contains an express provision establishing a condition precedent to submitting the matter to arbitration and CSEA had not complied with this condition precedent..

The court also noted that where such a condition precedent is expressly made part of the CBA, the issue of compliance with the condition is for the court to decide in the first instance.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_08985.htm

Reprinted with permission New York Public Personnel Law

Mitchell H. Rubinstein

Court of Appeals to consider arbitration award reinstating school bus driver terminated from the position after testing positive for marihuana in a random drug test

Shenendehowa Cent. School Dist. Bd. of Educ. (Civil Serv. Empls. Assn., Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, Local 864), 90 AD3d 1114

The Court of Appeals will hear Shenendehowa Central School District’s appeal from the Appellate Division's ruling sustaining an arbitrator’s award that reinstated a school bus driver terminated after testing positive for marihuana in a random drug test.

Motions by New York State School Boards Association, Inc. and by New York State United Teachers for leave to file briefs amicus curiae on the appeal were also granted by the court.

NYPPL summary the Appellate Division’s ruling in this action is posted on the Internet at:

http://publicpersonnellaw.blogspot.com/search?q=Shenendehowa

Reprinted with permission New York Public Personnel Law

Mitchell H. Rubinstein

Interpreting any statute, first and foremost, requires paying heed to the intent of the Legislature as reflected in the plain language of the statute

Samuelsen, as president of Local 100, Transport Workers Union of Greater New York v New York City Tr. Auth. et al, 2012 NY Slip Op 08780, Appellate Division, First Department

Local 100, Transport Workers Union of Greater New York [Union] is the exclusive collective bargaining representative of approximately 32,000 workers employed by various subordinate bodies and affiliates of the New York City Metropolitan Transportation Authority. One of its component units is the New York City Transit Authority (TA).

The Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Authority (MaBSTOA) was created by the Legislature in 1962 after the City of New York seized several privately owned and operated bus lines through its eminent domain power.*  

Public Authorities Law §1203-a, in pertinent part, provides: "[MaBSTOA] officers and employees shall not become, for any purpose, employees of the city or of the [TA] and shall not acquire civil service status or become members of the New York City Employees' Retirement System" (NYCERS). Although this arrangement was originally intended to operate "for a temporary period" (Public Authorities Law 1203-a[2]), it has continued until the present. Although the two authorities have remained separate legal entities, they  nevertheless developed, as a practical matter, functional overlap such as sharing common office facilities and a personnel department.

Certain differences, however, were maintained with respect to personnel matters. For example, the terms of employment for both TA and MaBSTOA employees were governed by a collective bargaining agreement [CBA], with certain exceptions such as the CBA providing that any layoffs of MaBSTOA employees would occur in reverse order of seniority, based upon date of hire. However there was no similar provision in that agreement concerning TA workers as the layoff of TA workers was controlled by the §§80 and 81 of the Civil Service Law. Another difference: set out in the CBA addressed “job selection.” MaBSTOA employees could pick only jobs associated with the bus lines operated by MaBSTOA while TA employees could pick only jobs associated with bus lines and subways operated by TA.

In December 2002, the TA and MaBSTOA executed a "Memorandum of Understanding" with the Union (MOU) that modified the CBA to provide for the consolidation of MaBSTOA and TA surface transit operations whereby "The Authority and the Union agree to the elimination of the artificial distinction between MaBSTOA and the Transit Authority….” To effectuate the MOU, the parties established a joint job pick procedure that allowed MaBSTOA and TA employees, subject to certain limitations, to "pick into" TA jobs and TA employees to "pick into" MaBSTOA jobs in accordance with a single, integrated seniority list, known as the "Consolidated Seniority List."

Asserting that this directly violates the prohibition in Public Authorities Law §1203-a(3)(b) against MaBSTOA employees becoming, "for any purpose, employees of the city or of the [TA],  the Union alleged that "as a result of" the MOU and the consolidation agreement, "employees of MaBSTOA are, for almost all purposes, employees of [the TA]. The Union further alleged that “MaBSTOA employees regularly work in [TA] facilities” and other than not having civil service status or participating in a different pension system, “MaBSTOA employees working for [TA] are for all purposes indistinguishable from [TA] employees."

The Union sought a judgment declaring that:

1. “No MaBSTOA employee may be treated as an employee of the TA for any purpose, and that the MOU and consolidation agreement are void and unenforceable to the extent that they have effectively made employees of MaBSTOA into employees of the TA.” and

2. Prohibiting the MaBSTOA from taking any action in accordance with the 2002 MOU and 2003 consolidation agreement that is prohibited under the Public Authorities Law, or that adversely affects the employment of any employee of MaBSTOA.

Supreme Court dismissed the Union’s complaint “for failure to state a cause of action.” The Appellate Division reversed the lower court’s ruling “on the law.”

As to Supreme Court’s finding that the Union’s compliant “failed to state a cause of action because nothing in the MOU or consolidation agreement indicated that MaBSTOA employees would gain civil service status or become members of NYCERS,” the Appellate Division explained that “[i]n interpreting any statute, we are required, first and foremost, to pay heed to the intent of the Legislature, as reflected by the plain language of the text,” citing Majewski v Broadalbin-Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 NY2d 577.

In addition, said the court, "[i]n construing statutes, it is a well-established rule that resort must be had to the natural signification of the words employed, and if they have a definite meaning, which involves no absurdity or contradiction, there is no room for construction and courts have no right to add to or take away from that meaning."

Noting that a plaintiff’s pleading is to be afforded a liberal construction, the Appellate Division held that “the facts alleged in the complaint are to be accepted as true, and plaintiff is to be accorded the benefit of every possible favorable inference,” citing Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83.

In the words of the court “… the language we are required to interpret is as follows: ‘[MaBSTOA] officers and employees shall not become, for any purpose, employees of the city or of the [TA] and shall not acquire civil service status or become members of [NYCERS]’ (Public Authorities Law 1203-a[3][b]). In our view, this plainly means that three separate prohibitions apply to MaBSTOA employees: (1) that they ‘shall not become, for any purpose,’ employees of the TA; and (2) that they shall not acquire civil service status; and (3) that they shall not become members of the NYCERS. Accordingly, we agree with the Union that, to the extent that the MOU and consolidation agreement, by merging many of the policies of the two authorities, such as probationary employment rules, disciplinary rules, and sick-leave rules, transform MaBSTOA employees into employees of the TA, the agreements violate the first prohibition.”

The Appellate Division rejected the City Transit Authority’s argument that "[t]he plain and obvious meaning of the 'for any purpose' language is to ensure that a MaBSTOA employee cannot, simply by virtue of employment by MaBSTOA, even in a contractually agreed upon commingled work force, acquire civil service status or membership in NYCERS."

The most glaring problem with this interpretation, said the court, is that “it is decidedly not what the statute says.” Rather, said the Appellate Division, “[t]he way the provision is written, the ‘and’ creates a separation between the ‘for any purpose’ clause and the rest of the sentence. It does not signal a modification to the ‘for any purpose’ clause or in any way refer back to it. Furthermore, defendants' interpretation renders the first prohibition superfluous, a result which ‘is to be avoided,’ [citing] Matter of Branford House v Michetti, 81 NY2d 681.”

In other words, said the court, “defendants argue that if a MaBSTOA employee cannot, under any circumstances, be subject to the Civil Service Law or participate in NYCERS, they simply cannot be considered TA ‘employees,’ rendering the first clause meaningless if not considered in the manner they urge. This approach is too narrow, for it pays no heed to the notion that different people working under the same employer can be classified differently.”

"In other words, not every employee in an organization is similarly situated. Here, the statute recognizes that MaBSTOA workers could become so integrated into the TA organization that they could be seen as TA employees, albeit without the protections of the Civil Service Law and the benefit of NYCERS participation. We simply discern nothing in the statutory language which confirms, as the dissent insists, that Civil Service Law protection is the distinguishing' or hallmark' quality of TA employment."

The majority, in response to a comment in the dissent, also observed that its approach was not in conflict with other provisions in the Public Authorities Law that might be interpreted as encouraging some standardization of the two agencies' operations.

Agreeing with the Union’s interpretation of Public Authorities Law §1203-a(3)(b), the Appellate Division held that complaint sufficiently alleged facts establishing that the MOU and consolidation agreement had the effect of conferring on MaBSTOA workers qualities of "employment" by the TA, it ruled that Supreme Court “erred in dismissing the complaint as not having stated a cause of action.”

* MaBSTOA became a subsidiary corporation of the TA.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_08780.htm

Reprinted by permission New York Public Personnel Law

Mitchell H. Rubinstein

Unambiguous contract of employment language that is inconsistent with the employer’s policy nevertheless controls

Chatelle v North Country Community Coll, 2012 NY Slip Op 08215, Appellate Division, Third Department

When North Country Community College hired Shane Chatelle as its Facilities and Special Projects Manager in 2004, the College’s President provided Chatelle with a letter setting forth his salary and enclosing a copy of the resolution of its Board of Trustees approving the appointment together with a written statement of the Board's "management confidential"* staff policy “purporting to provide,” that among other benefits, that Chatelle would be compensated for up to 180 days of accumulated sick leave upon his severance from employment.

In 2011, Chatelle resigned from his position and requested compensation for his accumulated sick leave. The College, claiming that, despite the statement provided to him upon his appointment, its actual policy authorized compensation for accrued sick leave only upon retirement.

Chatelle sued, contending breach of contract, among other things. Supreme Court granted Chatelle’s motion in part, awarding him $44,114.96 in damages for breach of contract but dismissed his remaining claims. Chatelle and the College “cross appealed” the Supreme Court’s ruling.

The Appellate Division said that the written statement provided to Chatelle upon his employment indicated that he was entitled to "the benefits afforded by the existing [m]aster [a]greements except where modified or defined by the following [benefits]."

With regard to the sick leave benefit, the statement provided that Chatelle was entitled to 30 sick days per year, cumulative to 180 days and "[a]t [the] time of severance sick leave will be compensated."

Although the College, relying on extrinsic evidence, argued that the statement given to Chatelle was in error and that the Board had intended to adopt a policy that only compensated for sick leave at retirement, the Appellate Division said that had “no reason to consider this [extrinsic] evidence because the statement's language is clear and unambiguous.”

Accordingly, said the court, the College is bound by the terms of the writing provided to Chatelle as part of his employment contract “and may not rely on its unilateral mistake to void the agreement,” explaining that the text of the statement is clear and Chatelle does not rely on past practice nor claim “estoppel to enforce his contractual right.”

The Appellate Division, however, modified Supreme Court’s judgment granting Chatelle $44,114.96 as payment for his unliquidated sick leave accruals by reducing the award to $4,770, “representing [Chatelle 's] 159 accrued sick days at $30 per day."

* Presumably Chatelle was designated "managerial" or "confidential" within the meaning of  §201.7 of the Civil Service Law [The Taylor Law] upon his appointment.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_08215.htm

Reprinted with permission New York Public Personnel Law

Mitchell H. Rubinstein

Newspaper reports admitted into evidence in an administrative disciplinary proceeding

2012 NY Slip Op 07479, Appellate Division, Fourth Department

A volunteer firefighter filed an Article 78 petition challenging the Volunteer Fire Company’s decision,  to expel him from membership in the Fire Company following a hearing held pursuant to General Municipal Law §207-l.

The petitioner contended that the Fire Company had violated §160.50 of the Criminal Procedure Law, which provides for the “sealing” of certain record, when the Company admitted into evidence media reports related to the petitioner's arrests or when it presented the testimony of a police investigator who was involved in the relevant criminal investigations.

As to newspaper media reports concerning petitioner's arrests, the Appellate Division, citing New York State Dept. of Mental Hygiene v State Div. of Human Rights, 103 AD2d 546, 549, affd 66 NY2d 752, said that such newspaper reports are not "official records and papers . . . relating to [the petitioner's] arrest or prosecution" within the meaning of CPL §160.50(1)(c). Further, said the court, it is " permissible to consider the independent evidence of the conduct [of the petitioner] leading to the criminal charges."

As to the testimony of the police investigator, the court explained that the police investigator was "free to testify from memory" concerning the conduct that led to the petitioner's arrests.”

The Appellate Division then stated there was substantial evidence establishing that the petitioner had exhibited a lack of "good moral character" in violation of Article II, §2 of the Fire Company's Constitution and By-laws and had committed misconduct under General Municipal Law §209-l".

N.B. §209-l provides for the removal of volunteer officers and volunteer members of fire departments charged with, and found guilty of, misconduct or incompetence after a hearing.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_07479.htm

Reprinted by permission New York Public Personnel Law

Mitchell H. Rubinstein

Arbitration award held to be “irrational and defies common sense” for a second time remanded to a different arbitrator

Social Servs. Employees Union Local 371 v City of New York Admin. for Children's Servs., 2012 NY Slip Op 07403, Appellate Division, First Department

A Child Protection Specialist Supervisor II with the New York City Administration for Children's Services (ACS), pleaded guilty to grand larceny in the fourth degree, for filing false income tax returns using confidential ACS client information to fraudulently claim entitlement to state and local tax credits.

This matter was ultimately assigned to disciplinary arbitrator Rose F. Jacobs, who imposed a penalty of suspension, after which employee was to be restored to his former position.

On appeal of the lower court's confirmance, the Appellate Division vacated the arbitrator's award as "irrational and defies common sense" because "[r]einstated to the position of ACS supervisor, [the employee] again would have access to the ACS database from which he extracted the information he used to perpetrate his crime."*

The court remanded the matter to the arbitrator for her reconsideration of the penalty to be imposed. Notwithstanding the clear directive by the Appellate Division not to do so, the arbitrator again restored employee to his former position.

Supreme Court denied Local 371’s CPLR 7510 petition to confirm the second award of the arbitrator reinstating the employee to his former position and granted the City’s cross petition to vacate the award insofar as it orders the reinstatement of the employee.

Local 371 appealed and the Appellate Division unanimously agreed with Supreme Court's ruling. It then remanded the matter to a different arbitrator for reconsideration of the appropriate penalty explaining that it found, “once again and for the same reasons, that the arbitrator's award is irrational and defies common sense,” citing City School District of the City of New York v Campbell, 20 AD3s 313.

Accordingly, the Appellate Division, approving Supreme Court’s “vacated the award reinstating the grievant,” said that it was remanding the matter to a different arbitrator only for reconsideration of the appropriate penalty.

* See 56 AD3d 322, 322 [1st Dept 2008], lv dismissed 12 NY3d 867.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_07403.htm

Reprinted by permission New York Public Personnel Law

Mitchell H. Rubinstein

The “continuing jurisdiction” of the arbitrator once a final determination is made is not automatic

New York State Dept. of Corr. Servs. (New York State Corr. Officers & Police Benevolent Assn., Inc.), 2012 NY Slip Op 07242, Appellate Division, Third Department

Upon the conclusion of a disciplinary arbitration the arbitrator found the employee guilty of certain charges and made an “interim award,” imposing a penalty of suspension without pay for 45 days and directing that the employee “otherwise be made whole.”

The final award mirrored the arbitrator's interim award but further provided that the arbitrator was "maintain[ing] jurisdiction . . . in the event that any dispute [arose] between the parties over the implementation of [the] [a]ward."

After the employee returned to work he filed a grievance alleging that the Department of Correctional Services* had not restored all of the back pay, time accruals and other benefits due him as directed by arbitration award.

Ultimately it appears that the employee’s union, the New York State Corr. Officers & Police Benevolent Assn. [NYSCOPBA] asked the arbitrator to reopen the arbitration to ascertain whether employee had been made whole pursuant to the terms of his award. A hearing date was scheduled, but the Department, contending that the arbitrator was powerless to, among other things, reopen, modify or explain the prior award, objected.

Notwithstanding the Department’s objection, the arbitrator conducted a hearing in which only NYSCOPBA participated and subsequently awarded the employee approximately $4,000 in vacation and holiday accruals.

The Department filed a petition pursuant to Article 75 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules seeking to vacate the award upon the ground that the arbitrator exceeded his power in reopening the proceeding. In rebuttal, NYSCOPBA argued that the Department had waived its right to seek vacatur of the award and cross-moved to confirm the award.

Supreme Court granted the Department’s application, vacating the award whereupon NYSCOPBA appealed contending that the Department “waived [its] opportunity to vacate the [challenged] arbitration award by, among other things, failing to challenge the arbitrator's assertion of continuing jurisdiction and/or participating in the [challenged] arbitration hearing."

The Appellate Division affirmed the Supreme Court’s ruling, rejecting NYSCOPBA’s argument that the Department had waived any of its rights. The court explained that the Department was “not immediately aggrieved by the arbitrator's purported retention of jurisdiction, the exercise of which admittedly was conditioned upon a future … entirely theoretical dispute between the parties as to the subsequent implementation of the award.”

Further, said the Appellate Division, while NYSCOPBA is correct that "a party that participates in the arbitration may not later seek to vacate the award by claiming it never agreed to arbitrate the dispute in the first place," here the Department expressly objected to the proposed hearing in writing, and it is undisputed that it did not attend in the hearing. Accordingly, the Appellate Division said that it was satisfied that the Department did not "actively participate [in the arbitration]."

As to merits of NYSCOPBA’s appeal, the court said that it is well settled “that an arbitrator has broad discretion to determine a dispute and fix a remedy, and that any contractual limitation on that discretion must be contained, either explicitly or incorporated by reference, in the arbitration clause itself.’

The Appellate Division said that the controlling provision of the collective bargaining agreement between the parties specifically provides that “[d]isciplinary arbitrators shall confine themselves to determinations of guilt or innocence and the appropriateness of proposed penalties . . . [and] shall neither add to, subtract from nor modify the provisions of [the CBA]." Further, said the court, the CBA agreement further provides that "[t]he disciplinary arbitrator's decision with respect to guilt[,] innocence [or] penalty . . . shall be final and binding upon the parties," which language “evidences a clear agreement by the parties to the CBA to ‘limit the discretion of disciplinary arbitrators.’"

While there may be circumstances where an arbitrator's retention of jurisdiction will be deemed permissible, in this instance the Appellate Division concluded that “such circumstances cannot — in light of the restrictive language of the underlying CBA — be said to exist here.”

Accordingly, court ruled that arbitrator's retention of jurisdiction in this matter "clearly exceed[ed] a specifically enumerated limitation [upon his] power” and the arbitrator's authority over the issues submitted to him ended once he rendered his decision.

* The Department of Correctional Services is now known as the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision. 

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_07242.htm

Reprinted with permission New York Public Personnel Law

Mitchell H. Rubinstein

Employee served with disciplinary charges alleging he was intoxicated at work

Human Resources Administration v Grimes, OATH Index #1985/12   

OATH Administrative Law Judge Kevin F. Casey sustained charges that alleged that an employee was intoxicated at work.

Coworkers noticed the individual looked disheveled and was laughing and crying to himself at his desk, in marked contrast to his usual demeanor. "911" was called and the employee was taken to a hospital by the first responders.

Noting that the Emergency Medical Technician's records indicated that the first responders had made a presumptive diagnosis that employee was intoxicated based on his unsteady gait, slurred speech, and the odor of alcohol on his breath, Judge Casey found the individual’s claims to the contrary to be vague and unsupported.

The ALJ recommended that the appointing authority impose a penalty of a 20-day suspension without pay

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://archive.citylaw.org/oath/12_Cases/12-1985.pdf

Reprinted with permission New York Public Personnel Law

Mitchell H. Rubinstein

Vacating a finding of being guilty of two of five disciplinary charges requires remanding the matter for reconsideration of the appropriate penalty to be imposed

The appointing authority adopted the findings and recommendation of a hearing officer that the employee was guilty of five charges of misconduct and terminated the individual’s employment.

Supreme Court dismissed the former employee’s petition challenging the appointing authority’s action.

The Appellate Division disagreed with this result, explaining that upon its review of the record it found that  the hearing officer's finding the individual guilty of two of the five charges had to be annulled and those two charges dismissed. In the opinion of the court, there was a lack of substantial evidence to support a finding that the employee was guilty of these two charges.

As the appointing authority had imposed a penalty based on the hearing officer’s finding that the individual was guilty of all five charges, the court said that the penalty imposed had to be vacated and the matter remit to the appointing authority to permit it to consider the appropriate penalty to be imposed upon the individual based on the individual having been found guilty of the three surviving charges

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_06608.htm 

Reprinted by permission New York Public Personnel Law

Mitchell H. Rubinstein

A Grievance Is Arbitrable Even After An Employee Dies

Union may continue to enforce CBA's mandatory arbitration provision on behalf of worker who died after grievance arose but before arbitration began. Sheet Metal Workers Local No. 2 v. Silgan Containers Mfg. Corp., ____F.3d___(8th Cir. 8/28/12)

Barring a former employee from property and Employee Does Not Have Right To Select Arbitrator

Toussaint v Local 100, TWU, CA2, U.S. App. LEXIS 16257

May an employer prohibit an individual it has dismissed from entering its property? The Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the employer may prohibit such an individual from entering its non-public areas.

A Transportation Workers Union representative had been dismissed from his position with the New York City Transit Authority [NYCTA]. NYCTA then banned the representative from the non-public areas of its property. The representative sued, contending that this action by NYCTA violated his First Amendment rights.

The Circuit Court affirmed a federal district court's dismissal of the Union representative’s petition. The lower court had determined that he "failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits" because:

1. He did not demonstrate that he was excluded from non-public areas because the Transit Authority's motivation was to impair the exercise of his First Amendment freedoms or;

2. The Transit Authority's rule barring discharged employees from non-public areas lacked a reasonable basis.

The representative also attempted to obtain a stay of arbitration, claiming that NYCTA and Local 100 went forward with his arbitration "without allowing him to participate in selecting a neutral arbitrator to chair the arbitration panel." The Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this representation as moot "because the arbitration [had] proceeded to conclusion."

Reprinted with permission New York Public Personnel Law

Mitchell Rubinstein

Labor Arbitration Agreement Given Collateral Estoppel In Unemployment Case

Matter of Redd v. Commissioner of Labor, ___A.D.3d___(3d Dept. Aug. 2, 2012), is an interesting case. An employee's discharge was upheld by an arbitrator. Those findings were held to be collateral estoppel and disqualifying misconduct. 

Mitchell H. Rubinstein

Court’s role in reviewing an arbitration award limited when the parties have agreed to submit the matter to arbitration

 

Arbitration between Albany Police Supervisor's Assn. and the City of Albany, 2012 NY Slip Op 03704, Appellate Division, Third Department

The Appellate Division affirmed a ruling by Supreme Court denying the Albany Police Supervisor’s Association’s CPLR Article 75 application to vacate an arbitration award and confirmed the award.

A member of the negotiating unit represented by the Association was served with disciplinary charges that eventually resulted in the termination of the member’s employment with the Albany Police Department.

Essentially the member was charged with allegedly failing to inform and misled superior officers about what had transpired with respect to an incident involving another Albany Police Department police officer. The arbitrator found the member guilty of nine of the 14 charges filed against him and concluded that his termination was the appropriate penalty.

In affirming the arbitration award the Appellate Division noted that "In circumstances when the parties agree to submit their dispute to an arbitrator, courts generally play a limited role," citing New York State Correctional Officers & Police Benevolent Assn. v State of New York, 94 NY2d 321 wherein the Court of Appeals said that "[A]n arbitrator's award should not be vacated for errors of law and fact committed by the arbitrator and the courts should not assume the role of overseers to mold the award to conform to their sense of justice."*

Here, said the court, the arbitrator's findings that member was untruthful when questioned by a superior officer concerning the event is supported by the record and did not result from the arbitrator grossly expanding the charges or other arbitral misconduct.

As to the penalty imposed, dismissal, the Appellate Division rejected the Association’s argument that the penalty was so disproportionate as to constitute arbitral misconduct as "unpersuasive.”

* A court may vacate an arbitration award only if it violates a strong public policy, is irrational, or clearly exceeds a specifically enumerated limitation on the arbitrator's power" (Matter of Falzone [New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co.], 15 NY3d 530

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_03704.htm

 

Reprinted by permission New York Public Personnel Law

Mitchell H. Rubinstein

A party’s failure to have an arbitration award confirmed is not a ground for vacating the award

 

The Appellate Division succinctly ruled that the application to vacate the arbitration award filed pursuant to Article 75 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules was made more than 90 days after the award was delivered to the individual and is therefore untimely.

The court also noted that although CPLR Article 75 provides a mechanism by which a party may obtain judicial confirmation of an arbitration award, the failure to have an award confirmed is not a ground for vacating the award, citing CPLR §§7510 and 7511[b][1].

Addressing another claim by the individual – that the arbitration award should be vacated under CPLR §751l(b)(1)(iv), “failure to follow the procedure,” the Appellate Division explained that subdivision (iv) address vacating the award because of a "failure to follow the procedure” set out in Article 75. 

However, said the court, if a party applying to vacate the award pursuant to subdivision (iv) continued with the arbitration with notice of the defect and without objection, the award may not be vacated for that reason.

In this instance, said the court, the party seeking to vacate the award under color of §751l(b)(1)(iv) participated in the arbitration without objection as to the procedure employed and thus the award could not be vacated as otherwise permitted by subdivision (iv).

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

 

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_02949.htm

Reprinted by permission New York Public Personnel Law

Mitchell H. Rubinstein

Determining if a grievance resulting from an alleged violation of a collective bargaining agreement is subject to arbitration

 

In the Matter of the Arbitration between the Village of Horseheads and the Horseheads Police Benevolent Assn., Inc., 2012 NY Slip Op 02543, Appellate Division, Third Department

The Appellate Division, affirming a lower court’s ruling, said that the role of the court in reviewing an application to stay arbitration is limited. In determining if a particular grievance is subject to arbitration, the court must first determine if the parties may lawfully arbitrate the underlying dispute and, if so, whether they did in fact agree to so arbitrate the issue.

In this instance the Village of Horseheads did not contend that there was a statutory, constitutional or public policy prohibition against arbitrating this particular grievance. Accordingly, the sole issue for the court to determine was whether or not the parties, in accordance with the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, agreed to arbitrate the grievance presented by the Police Benevolent Association. 

The relevant collective bargaining provision, said the court, defined a grievance as "any claimed violation, misinterpretation or inequitable application of existing laws, rules, procedures, regulations, application or enforcement of the terms of this agreement, administrative orders or work orders or rules of [the Village]." 
Whether the Village’s action constituted an actual violation of a rule or regulation "goes to the merits of the grievance [itself], not to its arbitrability," said the court. Accordingly, this was an issue for the arbitrator to resolve. 

In contrast, the Appellate Division emphasized that “For purposes of [its] limited inquiry, it [was] sufficient that [the Association had] asserted a ‘claimed violation’ of certain rules and regulations and that a ‘claimed violation’ is, in turn, subject to the grievance procedure set forth in the CBA “

The decision is posted on the Internet at: 

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_02543.htm

 

Reprinted by permission New York Public Personnel Law

Mitchell H. Rubinstein

Baseball Player Beats Drug Test

Braun Wins on Appeal is an interesting Feb. 23, 2012 New York Times article. A professional baseball player was suspended for a positive test. He challenged the test in arbitration and won. It appears that Major League Baseball could not establish a proper chain of custody and therefore, could not guarantee that the sample was not tampered with. 

This is a fairly common claim in arbitration, one I have even made. However, arbitrators rarely accept this defense. 

Mitchell H. Rubinstein

A party's demand to arbitrate a grievance must survive a two-prong test: is the subject of the dispute arbitrable and, if so, did the parties agree to do so

 

Arbitration between the Town Of Saugerties and the Town of Saugerties Policeman's Benevolent Assn., 2012 NY Slip Op 00458, Appellate Division, Third Department

The Town of Saugerties challenged the Supreme Court's denial of its CPLR 7503 petition to stay the arbitration of a grievance filed by the Town of Saugerties Policeman's Benevolent Association [PBA] concerning an order that required a police officer to work in excess of an eight-hour tour.

The Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) stated, among other things, that the Town "agrees to comply with the requirements of §971 of the Unconsolidated Laws of New York."*

Courts, said the Appellate Division, determine arbitrability according to a two-prong test:

1. May the parties arbitrate the dispute and, if so,

2. Whether the parties in fact agreed to do so.

The Town contended that demand to arbitrate fails both tests as the resolution of the dispute:

1. Requires the application or interpretation of the terms of a statute and public policy will not permit an arbitrator to apply or interpret a statute, and

2. The parties did not agree to arbitrate the application or interpretation of the statute at issue here.

The Appellate Davison decided that neither of the Town’s arguments had merit, explaining that the CBA incorporates §971 by reference, making the language of the statute a substantive provision of the CBA.

Further, said the court, the Town had identified any public policy that would preclude the arbitrator from interpreting such language set out in the CBA.

In addition, the court noted that the CBA defines disputes as "[a]ny grievance arising concerning the interpretation or application of the terms of this contract or the rights claimed thereunder and/or working conditions."

As the dispute underlying the PBA’s grievance concerns overtime, which is clearly a working condition, clearly one that the parties intended to arbitrate the Appellate Division concluded that Supreme Court correctly granted the PBA’s cross motion to compel arbitration and dismissed the Town’s petition.

* §971 of the Unconsolidated Law, in relevant part, provides that police officers shall not be assigned to tours of duty exceeding eight consecutive hours of each consecutive 24 hours, with certain exceptions. See, also,  Police Asso. of the City of Mt. Vernon v City of Mt. Vernon, 279 A.D.2d 561, posted on the Internet at: http://caselaw.findlaw.com/ny-supreme-court/1055483.html

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.courts.state.ny.us/reporter/3dseries/2012/2012_00458.htm

Reprinted by permission New York Public Personnel Law

Mitchell H. Rubinstein

 

Employee's inability to provide the necessary urine sample for a drug test because of a medical condition trumps allegations of misconduct

 

NYC Department of Sanitation v E.L., OATH Index #2107/11

The Department of Sanitation charged a sanitation worker, E.L., with failure to complete a federally mandated drug test in violation of Rule 2.5 of the Department’s Code of Conduct. 

E.L. had appeared for the test and was cooperative but was unable to provide the required amount of urine in the three hours he was given. He subsequently submitted a note from his urologist, explaining that E.L. had urological conditions that could have prevented him from urinating. Later E.L. was diagnosed as having prostate cancer. 

The Medical Review Officer (MRO), who had no specialized knowledge in urology, ruled that the note submitted by E.L.’s physician were insufficient to excuse for E.L.’s failure to provide a sufficient sample.  In addition, the MRO refused to consider E.L.’s prostate cancer as that condition was not diagnosed within the five-day time period the regulations gave test subjects for providing a note. 

As a result, the MRO marked respondent as having refused to take the drug test and the Department initiated disciplinary action against E.L. 

OATH Administrative Law Judge Kara J. Miller found that both the test collector and the MRO failed to follow federal drug testing procedures, and these procedural errors mandated cancellation of E.L.’s test. 

In addition Judge Miller ruled that even absent the necessity for cancellation, the charges against E.L. should be dismissed as his actions were not willful and the evidence established that he was physically unable to provide the required amount of urine when asked to the urine sample requested and dismissed the charges the Department had filed against E.L.  

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

 

http://archive.citylaw.org/oath/11_Cases/11-2107.pdf

Reprinted with permission New York Public Personnel Law

Mitchell H. Rubinstein