1st Holds High Level Employee Can Be Terminated Because of His Political Affiliation

Nader v. Blair, ___F.3d___(4th Cir. Dec. 12, 2008), is an interesting decision. Employer's motion for summary judgment was properly granted on Appellant's claims that she was unlawfully terminated based on her political affiliation. The position of Assistant Director at the Baltimore City Department of Social Services is one for which political affiliation is a constitutionally permissible ground for termination. The court did a nice job in summarizing the applicable standards as follows:

Nader first contends that the district court erred in determining
as a matter of law that the Assistant Director position
was the type of position that could be subject to a patronage
dismissal. A pair of Supreme Court decisions, Elrod v. Burns,
427 U.S. 347 (1976), and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507
(1980), established the standards for determining whether
patronage dismissals of government employees violate the
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of freedom of political
belief and association. In determining whether political
patronage dismissals are constitutionally permissible, theessential question "is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate
that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for
the effective performance of the public office involved."
Branti, 445 U.S. at 518; accord Stott v. Haworth, 916 F.2d
134, 140 (4th Cir. 1990). This Court has adopted the "generally
accepted broad interpretation" derived from the Elrod-
Branti line of cases that "[p]olitical affiliation is an appropriate
requirement when there is a rational connection between
shared ideology and job performance." Stott, 916 F.2d at 142
(internal quotations omitted).
In Stott, this Court adopted a two-part formulation of the
Elrod-Branti analysis that was first articulated by an en banc
panel of the First Circuit in Jimenez Fuentes v. Torres Gaztambide,
807 F.2d 236, 241-42 (1st Cir. 1986). Under this
two-part analysis, a court must first "examin[e] whether the
position at issue, no matter how policy-influencing or confidential
it may be, relates to partisan political interests . . . or
concerns." Stott, 916 F.2d at 141 (internal quotations omitted).
In particular, the court must consider whether the position
"involve[s] government decisionmaking on issues where
there is room for political disagreement on goals or their
implementation[.]" Id. at 141-42 (internal quotations omitted).

Mitchell H. Rubinstein