Gender and the Law Prof Blog

Editor: Tracy A. Thomas
University of Akron School of Law

Thursday, April 6, 2017

In 1783 Woman Petitions Former Slave Master's Estate for Pension

I'm always interested in new examples of women's historical agency and use of the law.  

Women Petitioners: Belinda Sutton, an Ex-Slave in Massachusetts

In February 1783, Belinda Sutton petitioned the Massachusetts General Court for a pension from the estate of Isaac Royall Jr, her late master. (In this petition she names herself simply ‘Belinda, an Affrican’, but in later documents she gave the surname Sutton, her married name.) She had been born in Ghana 70 years earlier and kidnapped by slavers when she was just 12 years old.  The petition is one of the earliest narratives by an African-American woman, and an early demand for reparations for the injustice and exploitation of slavery. The court ordered that she should have her pension, but she had to petition again a number of times in later years to continue receiving it.

 

The Petition of Belinda an Affrican, humbly shews.

That seventy years have rolled away, since she on the banks of the Rio da Valta received her existence. The mountains covered with spicy forests, the valleys loaded with the richest fruits, spontaneously produced, joined to that happy temperature of air to exclude excess, would have yielded her the most compleat felicity, had not her mind received early impressions of the cruelty of men, whose faces were like the moon, and whose bows and arrows were like the thunder and the lightning of the clouds. The idea of these, the most dreadful of all enemies, filled her infant slumbers with horror, and her noontide moments with cruel apprehensions! But her affrighted imagination, in its most alarming extension, never represented distresses equal to what she hath since really experienced. For before she had twelve years injoyed the fragrance of her native groves, and e’er she realized, that Europeans placed their happiness in the yellow dust which she carelessly marked with her infant footsteps, even when she, in a sacred grove, with each hand in that of a tender parent, was paying her devotions to the great Orisa who made all things, an armed band of white men, driving many of her countrymen in chains, rushed into the hallowed shades! Could the tears, the sighs and supplications, bursting from tortured parental affection, have blunted the keen edge of avarice, she might have been rescued from agony, which many of her countrys children have felt, but which none hath ever yet described. In vain she lifted her supplicating voice to an insulted father, and her guiltless hands to a dishonoured deity! She was ravished from the bosom of her country, from the arms of her friends, while the advanced age of her parents, rendering them unfit for servitude, cruelly separated her from them forever!

 

Scenes which her imagination had never conceived of – a floating world – the sporting monsters of the deep and the familiar meetings of billows and clouds strove but in vain to divert her melancholly attention, from three hundred Affricans in chains, suffering the most excruciating torments; and some of them rejoicing that the pangs of death came like a balm to their wounds.

 

Once more her eyes were blest with a continent – but alas! how unlike the land where she received her being! Here all things appeared unpropitious – she learned to catch the Ideas, marked by the sounds of language, only to know that her doom was slavery, from which death alone was to emancipate her. What did it avail her, that the walls of her lord were hung with splendor, and that the dust troden underfoot in her native country, crowded his gates with sordid worshipers? The laws had rendered her incapable of receiving property, and though she was a free moral agent, accountable for her actions, yet she never had a moment at her own disposal!

 

Fifty years her faithful hands have been compelled to ignoble servitude for the benefit of an Isaac Royall, untill, as if nations must be agitated, and the world convulsed for the preservation of that freedom which the Almighty Father intended for all the human race, the present war was commenced. The terror of men armed in the cause of freedom, compelled her master to fly and to breathe away his life in a land where lawless domination sits enthroned, pouring bloody outrage and cruelty on all who dare to be free.

 

The face of your petitioner is now marked with the furrows of time, and her frame feebly bending under the oppression of years, while she, by the laws of the land, is denied the injoyment of one morsel of that immense wealth, a part whereof hath been accumilated by her own industry, and the whole augmented by her servitude.

 

Wherefore casting herself at the feet of your honours, as to a body of men, formed for the extirpation of vassalage, for the reward of virtue, and the just returns of honest industry, she prays, that such allowance may be made her out of the estate of Colonel Royall, as will prevent her and her more infirm daughter from misery in the greatest extreme, and scatter comfort over the short and downward path of their lives

And she will ever pray.

Petition of an African slave, to the legislature of Massachusetts (full text of the printed version of Belinda’s petition, reprinted in William & Mary Quarterly)

April 6, 2017 in Legal History | Permalink | Comments (0)

Trial Lawyers' Report Concludes Campus Sexual Assault Process Unfair Against Accused

New Report on Colleges and Sex Assault Cases

With the Trump administration reportedly debating whether to reverse Obama administration guidance on how colleges should investigate sexual assault, a group of trial lawyers has released a report suggesting the current processes on many campuses are unfairly slanted against the accused.

 

The guidance, issued in a 2011 Dear Colleague letter, was meant to clarify areas of the law, the administration said at the time. It beefed up protections for victims of sexual assault and was a way to push colleges to more thoroughly respond to complaints. Such guidance does not carry the force of law, but it did contain a threat that colleges’ federal funding could be revoked should they fail to comply

 

The American College of Trial Lawyers, in a report last month, said this prospective loss of funding, combined with heavy media attention on cases of sexual assault, has resulted in colleges sometimes disregarding the rights of those accused and on occasion recklessly siding with someone making a complaint to avoid backlash.

 

It suggested that:

  • All hearings in sexual misconduct cases be conducted keeping in mind even the appearance of partiality -- fact finders assigned to the cases should be vetted for any conflicts of interest or affiliations.
  • Anyone accused in a case should be provided with full details of the allegations against them and kept abreast of all evidence as the case proceeds.
  • Those accused should be advised of their right to a lawyer and be allowed to have one present at all stages of an investigation.
  • Parties, including the one accused, should be allowed to do cross-examination of witnesses. (This could be particularly controversial, considering it is generally advised that victims do not interact with the alleged perpetrator. The lawyers' group notes that court systems have said there are alternate ways to see victim testimony, such as via a tape-recorded message or closed-circuit TV.)
  • The accused should be provided with a written record in case they wish to appeal.

April 6, 2017 in Education, Violence Against Women | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, March 30, 2017

New Books: Blaming Mothers

Linda Fenitmen, Blaming Mothers: American Law and the Risks to Children's Health (2017)

In Blaming Mothers, Professor Fentiman explores how mothers became legal targets. She explains the psychological processes we use to confront tragic events and the unconscious race, class, and gender biases that affect our perceptions and influence the decisions of prosecutors, judges, and jurors. Fentiman examines legal actions taken against pregnant women in the name of “fetal protection” including court ordered C-sections and maintaining brain-dead pregnant women on life support to gestate a fetus, as well as charges brought against mothers who fail to protect their children from an abusive male partner. She considers the claims of physicians and policymakers that refusing to breastfeed is risky to children’s health. And she explores the legal treatment of lead-poisoned children, in which landlords and lead paint manufacturers are not held responsible for exposing children to high levels of lead, while mothers are blamed for their children’s injuries. 
 
Blaming Mothers is a powerful call to reexamine who - and what - we consider risky to children’s health. Fentiman offers an important framework for evaluating childhood risk that, rather than scapegoating mothers, provides concrete solutions that promote the health of all of America’s children.

March 30, 2017 in Books, Family | Permalink | Comments (0)

Why the Pence Rule of Working with Women is Sexist

Much ado in the news today about the Pence Rule of Working with Women. There are reports of Vice-President Mike Pence’s practice that he “that he never eats alone with a woman other than his wife and that he won’t attend events featuring alcohol without her by his side.” It was mentioned in the context of discussing he and his wife Karen have preserved their marriage.  Pence’s rule is actually a version of the "Billy Graham Rule" adopted by the famous evangelist.  Rev. Graham refused to meet, travel, or dine with a woman alone.  A similar story about a similar practice among conservative members of Congress appeared in 2015.  The rule is also sometimes thrown around (by non-lawyers) in sexual harassment training as a “best practice” and way for men to protect themselves against false accusations by women.

Commentary has pointed out how the Pence/Graham practice penalizes women by denying them access to fully do their job, as well as advancement.  See How Mike Pence's Refusing to Eat with Women Hurts Women And that it is illegal sex discrimination because it denies women equal opportunity in the workplace.  The current discussion serves as a reminder of the more subtle ways in which sex discrimination exists in the workplace today, evolved from the days of segregated help-wanted ads into segregated access to full workplace responsibilities.

Missing so far from the discussion is something more fundamental to understanding the law against sexism. What is discriminatory about the Pence-Graham practice is that it reinforces sexist ideas of women. It depicts women as sexual objects, regardless of context. As primarily sexual objects, they are controlled and dominated by male-led society. Systemically this is a legal problem because all women are treated as inferior based on subordinate ideals of women’s true nature as sexual object.  This is the core of legal theorist Catharine MacKinnon’s work showing the deeper social and systemic nature of sexism when law and business practices allow it to continue.

MacKinnon made her argument initially in the context of sexual harassment. The Pence Rule is an overcorrection of the same problem.  While not encouraging the sexual behavior of women, it still conveys the same message that women exist only for sex and control by men. 

Moving from the theoretical to the practical, the Pence Rule also clearly reinforces the notion that women at work are not equally relevant.  Men in power have no real need to meet with women in a confidential setting.  The judge does not need to deliberate in confidence with a law clerk, the dean does not need to discuss confidential matters with the associate dean, and the president does not need to dine with the prime minister.

 

March 30, 2017 in Equal Employment, Theory | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, March 28, 2017

Flexibility as the Key to Women's Leadership and Workplace Success

Flexibility Will Close the Women's Leadership Gap

New data shows that women are underrepresented in the highest levels of leadership because they are being forced out by dated workplace structures. These structures, which do not represent the modern needs of a two-income household labor force, are causing millions of talented employees to fail, especially working mothers—and the result is massive attrition at every point in the leadership pipeline.

 

Contrary to popular belief, the majority of women who leave the corporate workforce actually want to stay. A recent Bain study showed that women value flexibility over and above any other factor in their career search, including compensation, title, and location. Of the 30 percent of credentialed women who drop out of the workforce, 70percent say they would have stayed if they had access to flexibility. This amounts to 6.6 million women—enough to dramatically increase the number of women in leadership and rapidly accelerate the advancement of corporate gender equality.

 

Strategic workplace flexibility is the easiest and most cost effective way to retain women in the workplace and advance them to positions of leadership over time.

 

While many companies have demonstrated a commitment to helping women advance to positions of leadership, they remain largely unsuccessful because strategic flexibility is not a key component of their programming. When companies do provide flexibility programs, they are often underutilized or fail entirely because flexibility is misunderstood. Women tend to not take advantage of existing flexibility policies due to a fear that their requests will make them appear less committed and a concern that flexibility policies will not be faithfully implemented.

 

Flexibility isn’t simply working from home via video conference or a lifestyle perk like free cereal; it’s a fundamental shift in the way we think about and expect our employees to work. Flexibility does not alter a job’s scope of responsibilities or expected results—it simply modifies the existing agreement between the employer and employee to increase compatibility. And when it’s negotiated in a standardized context, it normalizes the conversation around flexibility and eliminates the bias or discomfort women tend to feel during the interview and hiring process.

March 28, 2017 in Business, Work/life, Workplace | Permalink | Comments (0)

Proposing an End to the Collateral Consequences of Civil Domestic Violence Cases

Joann Sahl, Can We Forgive Those Who Batter? Proposing an End to the Collateral Consequences of Civil Domestic Violence Cases, 101 Marquette L.Rev. 527 (2016) [WL link]

Domestic violence is the most common tort committed in our country, involving nearly 1.3 million victims. When a domestic violence incident occurs, the press regularly reports it. Highlighted in these articles is the name of the perpetrator.
 
Perpetrators identified as committing an act of domestic violence face public outrage, contempt, and stigma. This is particularly true if a court determines that the act of domestic violence necessitates a civil protection order (CPO) that bars the perpetrator from having any contact with the victim. Nearly 1.2 million people receive a CPO each year. More people use this civil remedy than those who seek a tort remedy, or those who are involved with the criminal justice system.
 
The CPO process, and its related orders, produces real and lasting “prejudicial collateral legal consequences” that extend past the life of the CPO. These consequences can include preventing the perpetrator from finding or keeping employment, obtaining a professional license, or being admitted to an academic institution. The prejudicial legal consequences arise because information about the perpetrator's involvement in a CPO case is not confidential. At least twenty-seven states, Guam and Puerto Rico allow public access to protection order files.
 
This continuing public access to CPO cases, even when there is no active order, means the former batterer is subjected to perpetual prejudicial consequences from the CPO case. To end these ongoing consequences, the courts should allow perpetrators to seal inactive CPO cases from public view. This sealing remedy is necessary to ameliorate the significant economic impact of those consequences. * * * 
 
Proposing a remedy to help those once labeled a batterer may ignite controversy. As one author has noted, “[w]orking to improve the conditions abusers face has long been considered taboo in the battered women's movement.” However, the sealing remedy proposed by this article is not at odds with the CPO process and its underlying rationale. A CPO is to provide “a simple, immediate remedy to increase the safety of victims." Once the court, or the victim, determines that the CPO is no longer necessary for the victim's safety, the CPO has achieved its purpose, so the collateral consequences related to the CPO should end as well.

March 28, 2017 in Violence Against Women | Permalink | Comments (0)

Books: The Public Law of Gender--From the Local to the Global

Kim Rubenstein & Katharine G. Young, eds. The Public Law of Gender: From the Local to the Global (Cambridge Univ. Press 2016)

With the worldwide sweep of gender-neutral, gender-equal or gender-sensitive public laws in international treaties, national constitutions and statutes, it is timely to document the raft of legal reform and to critically analyse its effectiveness. In demarcating the academic study of the public law of gender, this book brings together leading lawyers, political scientists, historians and philosophers to examine law's structuring of politics, governing and gender in a new global frame. Of interest to constitutional and statutory designers, advocates, adjudicators and scholars, the contributions explore how concepts such as equality, accountability, representation, participation and rights, depend on, challenge or enlist gendered roles and/or categories. These enquiries suggest that the new public law of gender must confront the lapses in enforcement, sincerity and coverage that are common in both national and international law and governance, and critically and pluralistically recast the public/private distinction in family, community, religion, customary and market domains.

The Table of Contents is here.

March 28, 2017 in Books, Constitutional, International | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, March 27, 2017

Exploring Why Women are Twice as Likely to Win Family Leave Cases than Employment Discrimination

Katharine Bartlett, When Less is More, JOTWELL, reviewing Kate Webber, Families are More Popular Than Feminism: Exploring the Greater Judicial Success of Family and Medical Leave Laws, 32 Colum. J. Gender & Law 145 (2016).

Why are employees who sue to obtain workplace leave under the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) almost twice as likely to win their cases as those who bring discrimination cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)? The title of Kate Webber’s intriguing article reflects an intuition many feminists and family law scholars already bring to the table: courts find women more sympathetic when they make claims that conform to their appropriate gender roles (as they do when they ask for family leaves) than when they challenge those norms in the workplace (as they do when they make a claim that the workplace is discriminatory). Webber unpacks this intuition, first by identifying differences in the statutory schemes that might help to explain the gap in success rates between the two statutes, and then by examining the ways in which the content of the legal protections each statute provides might understandably trigger different ideological and cognitive responses by judges. The analysis is both cautious and compelling. It is also surprisingly optimistic, concluding that family leave laws provide a legislative model that may actually be more effective than Title VII in reducing institutional workplace inequality.

March 27, 2017 in Equal Employment | Permalink | Comments (0)

Comparative Perspectives on the International Regulation of Abortion

Siobhan Mullally and Claire Murray, Regulating Abortion: Dissensus and the Politics of Rights, 25 Social & Legal Studies: An International Journal (2016)

This special issue brings together comparative perspectives on the regulation of abortion. It examines the sociopolitical contexts within which proposals to expand access to abortion for women are won and lost. Women’s claim to a right to safe and legal abortion services is relatively new in the language of human rights; yet, it is one that continues to ‘trickle up’ and to ‘download’ across diverse jurisdictions. As the essays in this volume acknowledge, however, the universalized power of law, and the turn to law to secure a vindication of rights, brings with it certain risks. These risks of ignoring context and the messy processes of implementation are highlighted in the essays collected together in this volume.

March 27, 2017 in Abortion, International, Reproductive Rights | Permalink | Comments (0)

The Feminization of Migration and Threats to Women's Health and Safety

Berta E. Hernandez-Truyol, Globalizing Women's Health & Safety: Migration, Work & Labor

Abstract

Worldwide, women's equality remains elusive in the social, political, civil, economic and cultural spheres. Such reality presents a challenge in the movement of persons across state borders because, globally, the world is experiencing a feminization of migration. In turn, the feminization of migration effects threats to the health and safety of migrant women, whose well-being is in peril at all stages of the migration journey – from the country of origin, to the transit states, to the receiving state – from smugglers and official actors alike. Because the globalization discourses exclude the movement of persons and focus on the movement of goods and services, migrants become invisible. This work suggests a paradigmatic shift in the way institutions engage migration – from a system that treats migrants as disposable people and focuses on legality of presence to a human rights-inspired one that centers on migrants' well-being and dignitary interests. In support of this shift, this essay employs the overarching frameworks of glocalization and of marginableness to fill the existent void in the current conversations on migration. Three premises are foundational in the discussion: one, woman is not a monolithic category and its meaning is culturally dependent so it is imperative not to exclude any "woman;" two, there is no monolithic migrant woman and some, such as LGBT migrants, face mutidimensional challenges; and, three, the human rights system utilized is not the existent one but rather one reimagined without it being tethered to its western, heteronormative, patriarchal, colonialist, racialized, sexist origins. Such a reimagined human rights paradigm provides the foundation for migrants' protections in their perilous journeys.

March 27, 2017 in International | Permalink | Comments (0)

Friday, March 24, 2017

Judicial Interactions at SCOTUS Oral Arguments are Highly Gendered

Tonja Jacobi & Dylan Schweers, Justice, Interrupted: The Effect of Gender, Ideology and Seniority at Supreme Court Oral Arguments, 103 Virginia L. Rev. (forthcoming 2017).

This Article studies how the justices compete to have influence at oral argument, by examining the extent to which the Justices interrupt each other; it also scrutinizes how advocates interrupt the Justices, contrary to the rules of the Court. We find that judicial interactions at oral argument are highly gendered, with women being interrupted at disproportionate rates by their male colleagues, as well as by male advocates. Oral argument interruptions are also highly ideological, not only because ideological foes interrupt each other far more than ideological allies do, but we show that conservatives interrupt liberals more frequently than vice versa. Seniority also has some influence on oral arguments, but primarily through the female justices learning over time how to behave more like male justices, avoiding traditionally female linguistic framing in order to reduce the extent to which they are dominated by the men.

For another report reaching a similar conclusion, see Study Shows Male Justices Interrupt Female Justices More During Oral Argument

March 24, 2017 in Courts, Gender, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

Would Gorsuch Follow Supreme Court Precedent on Pregnancy Discrimination

Gillian Thomas, Would Gorsuch Follow Supreme Court Precedent Rejecting Discrimination?

A former law student’s allegations that U.S. Supreme Court nominee Judge Neil Gorsuch last year told a University of Colorado Law School class that women often “use” their employers for maternity coverage, only to quit after giving birth—and accordingly, that female applicants should be questioned about their pregnancy plans—are jaw-dropping, if true. As Emily Martin of the National Women’s Law Center wrote this week in U.S. News & World Report, such opinions contravene a body of sex-discrimination law going back nearly 50 years.

 

Judge Gorsuch was questioned briefly at a confirmation hearing Tuesday about the alleged statements, and not surprisingly, he denied making them. The statements have been corroborated by a second student in the class and contemporaneous documents produced by the original complaining student, but they also have been disputed by other students.

 

Members of the Senate Judiciary Committee should be alarmed by Gorsuch’s refusal to go beyond merely defending his classroom statements and give a full-throated repudiation of pregnancy discrimination, which remains one of the most pervasive barriers to working women nearly 40 years after enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.

 

There is an even more fundamental legal principle at stake, though, about which Gorsuch remained silent. Gorsuch allegedly told his students that employers not only can rely on stereotypes in making employment decisions—that is, by assuming that a woman will quit once she becomes a mother—but that they should (so that they can “protect themselves”). But the Supreme Court has found, time and again, that it is illegal to rely on a stereotype about a group in making a decision about an individual employee. Does Gorsuch agree? We still don’t know.

 

In the 1978 case City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, the Supreme Court found illegal an employer’s pension plan that required female workers to contribute more to the plan than their male colleagues because actuarial calculations showed that women generally lived longer than men. The plan violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964—the federal law outlawing employment discrimination because of race, national origin, color, religion, and sex—because, the Court explained, the law “precludes treatment of individuals as simply components of a racial, religious, sexual, or national class. If height is required for a job, a tall woman may not be refused employment merely because, on the average, women are too short.” Admonished the Court: “Even a true generalization about the class is an insufficient reason for disqualifying an individual to whom the generalization does not apply.”

 

A decade later, the Court ruled that a Big Eight accounting firm’s rejection of a female candidate for partner because she was “macho” and needed “a course at charm school” had violated Title VII: “[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their group.” Soon after, the Court invalidated a battery manufacturer’s policy that prohibited women of childbearing age from holding any job involving contact with lead, which could be toxic to fetuses. (Those risky jobs also, not surprisingly, paid more than others at the company.) That policy, the Court ruled, assumed that any fertile woman was a potential mother, regardless of whether she was sexually active, used birth control, or wanted children. Again, ascribing group characteristics to the detriment of an individual employee—even for allegedly benevolent reasons—was found to violate anti-discrimination principles.

 

In the five decades since Title VII was enacted, myriad other stereotypes have been recognized by courts as motivating illegal discrimination.

For elaboration on the point about Manhart and generalized stereotypes that are true, see my chapter on the case in US Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Opinions of the Supreme Court (Kathy Stanchi, Linda Berger, & Bridget Crawford, eds) (Cambridge Univ. Press 2016). 

March 24, 2017 in Constitutional, Judges, Pregnancy, Reproductive Rights, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

New Books: Sex and the Constitution

Geoffrey Stone, Sex & the Constitution (2017)

From the publisher:

 

Beginning his volume in the ancient and medieval worlds, Geoffrey R. Stone demonstrates how the Founding Fathers, deeply influenced by their philosophical forebears, saw traditional Christianity as an impediment to the pursuit of happiness and to the quest for human progress. Acutely aware of the need to separate politics from the divisive forces of religion, the Founding Fathers crafted a constitution that expressed the fundamental values of the Enlightenment.

 

Although the Second Great Awakening later came to define America through the lens of evangelical Christianity, nineteenth-century Americans continued to view sex as a matter of private concern, so much so that sexual expression and information about contraception circulated freely, abortions before “quickening” remained legal, and prosecutions for sodomy were almost nonexistent.

 

The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries reversed such tolerance, however, as charismatic spiritual leaders and barnstorming politicians rejected the values of our nation’s founders. Spurred on by Anthony Comstock, America’s most feared enforcer of morality, new laws were enacted banning pornography, contraception, and abortion, with Comstock proposing that the word “unclean” be branded on the foreheads of homosexuals. Women increasingly lost control of their bodies, and birth control advocates, like Margaret Sanger, were imprisoned for advocating their beliefs. In this new world, abortions were for the first time relegated to dank and dangerous back rooms.

 

The twentieth century gradually saw the emergence of bitter divisions over issues of sexual “morality” and sexual freedom. Fiercely determined organizations and individuals on both the right and the left wrestled in the domains of politics, religion, public opinion, and the courts to win over the soul of the nation. With its stirring portrayals of Supreme Court justices, Sex and the Constitution reads like a dramatic gazette of the critical cases they decided, ranging from Griswold v. Connecticut (contraception), to Roe v. Wade (abortion), to Obergefell v. Hodges (gay marriage), with Stone providing vivid historical context to the decisions that have come to define who we are as a nation.

Also of related interest might be Leigh Ann Wheeler, How Sex Became a Civil Liberty (Oxford 2012).

March 24, 2017 in Books, Constitutional, Reproductive Rights | Permalink | Comments (0)

Thursday, March 23, 2017

Reinventing Antidiscrimination Law

Nancy Levit, June Carbone, Naomi Cahn, Gender and the Tournament: Reinventing Antidiscrimination Law in the Age of Inequality, Texas L. Rev. (forthcoming)

Since the 1970’s, antidiscrimination advocates have approached Title VII as though the impact of the law on minorities and women could be considered in isolation. This article argues that this is a mistake. Instead, Reinventing Antidiscrimination Law attempts to reclaim Title VII’s original approach, which justified efforts to dismantle segregated workplaces as necessary to both eliminate discrimination and promote economic growth. Using that approach, this Article is the first to consider how widespread corporate tournaments and growing gender disparities in the upper echelons of the economy are intrinsically intertwined, and how they undermine the core promises of antidiscrimination law. The Article draws on a pending case challenging the “rank and yank” evaluation system at Microsoft, as well as social science literature regarding narcissism and stereotype expectations, to illustrate how consideration of the legitimacy of competitive pay for performance schemes is essential to combating the intrinsically gendered nature of advancement in the new economy.

March 23, 2017 in Equal Employment, Theory | Permalink | Comments (0)

Tuesday, March 21, 2017

Remembering Judge Shirley Hufstedler - One of the Famous Firsts

Robert Percival, The Judge Who Climbed Mountains, 69 Stanford L. Rev. (March 2017)

Shirley and Seth Hufstedler loved to climb mountains. The week before the U.S. Department of Education opened its doors in 1980, a profile of them reported that their “favorite hobby is mountain climbing” and noted they had made five trips to the Nepalese Himalayas. When interviewed decades later, Shirley Hufstedler fondly recalled how she and Seth “walked up and down mountains all over the world.

 
Those were not the only mountains Shirley Hufstedler climbed. To ascend to the highest ranks of the legal profession she had to overcome enormous obstacles then facing women who pursued a legal career. Although the dream of making a woman’s first ascent to the Supreme Court ultimately eluded her, she blazed a trail for those who followed.***

Judge Hufstedler opened her own one-woman law practice. Her big break came when a former professor invited her to help defend the state of California in the Arizona v. California water rights dispute being heard by the Supreme Court. Her brief-writing work on the case quickly earned widespread admiration, though she was not at the counsel table when the case was argued before the Supreme Court.

 

California Governor Pat Brown took notice of Shirley Hufstedler’s extraordinary legal talent and appointed her to the Los Angeles County Superior Court in 1961. She then was the only woman out of 120 judges on that court. She quickly established herself as a valuable member of the court, pioneering a procedure for issuing tentative decisions that helped reduce the court’s enormous backlog of cases. When asked whether she felt like she had to do anything special to fit into a male-dominated world, Judge Hufstedler replied: “No, I just did my job. And I think doing my job and doing it capably was adequate to be able to help everybody else make a judgment that they didn't have a fox in the hen house.” 

 


In 1966 Governor Brown elevated her to become an Associate Judge on the California Court of Appeal. Two years later, President Lyndon Johnson appointed her to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Judge Hufstedler was only the second woman ever to serve as a judge on a U.S. Court of Appeals [after Florence Allen] and the only woman serving at the time.

March 21, 2017 in Judges, Legal History, Women lawyers | Permalink | Comments (0)

Following the Changes in the Supreme Court's Abortion Law

Mary Ziegler,  The New Negative Rights: Abortion Funding and Constitutional Law after Whole Woman's Health:

The Hyde Amendment, a ban on the Medicaid funding of abortion, is once again at the center of the abortion wars. For the most part, critics of the Hyde Amendment argue that it authorizes discrimination against poor women. Using original archival research, this Article show that the amendment has had a far greater impact.

In popular debate, proponents of the Hyde Amendment helped to forge an idea of complicity-based conscience that has recently transformed fights about everything from same-sex marriage to contraceptive access. Constitutionally, the fight for the Hyde Amendment also revolutionized the rights-privilege distinction in constitutional law. In abortion-funding cases, the Court held that there was no constitutional problem with laws that created practical obstacles to abortion access so long as the obstacles themselves were not controlled or created by the state. This approach has resonated outside the context of abortion law.

The Court’s recent decision in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt makes a challenge to the Hyde Amendment realistic and compelling. The cases upholding the Hyde Amendment regard as constitutional any burden on a woman’s right to choose that is neither created nor controlled by the government. Whole Woman’s Health explicitly rejected this approach, looking instead at how the formal terms of law interact with forces beyond the government’s control. For this reason, the Article shows that Whole Woman’s Health undermines the core premises of the Hyde Amendment and creates an opening for those seeking to revisit the distinction between negative and positive rights.

Mary Ziegler, Liberty and the Politics of Balance: The Undue Burden Test after Casey/Hellerstedt:

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt represents the Supreme Court’s most important intervention in the constitutional politics of abortion. However, as this Article shows, Hellerstedt does not represent the clean break some commentators identify. Instead, the decision comes at the end of a decades-long movement-countermovement conflict about the meaning of an unconstitutional undue burden on a woman’s right to choose abortion.

Positioning Hellerstedt in historical context matters because doing so underscores the Court’s ongoing responsiveness to popular views of what the Constitution says about abortion. The history studied in the Article also reveals what should happen in the next front of the abortion wars, when the Court considers fetal-protective, rather than woman-protective, antiabortion laws. To maintain the delicate balance created by Casey, the Court should require evidence that both fetal-protective and woman-protective abortion regulations are substantially related to their stated goal.

 

March 21, 2017 in Abortion, Constitutional, Legal History, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

Writing on Abortion

Carol Sanger, Why, What, and Now: Writing on Abortion

I’ve just written a book called About Abortion: Terminating Pregnancy in 21st Century America. For years I hadn’t wanted to work on the issue of abortion because from an advocacy standpoint post-Casey v. Planned Parenthood, it meant being in a defensive posture, responding to whatever state legislatures had dished out. From a professorial perspective, abortion is most often taught in Con Law, usually in the sequence of privacy cases. This makes for interesting doctrinal lessons, but locating Roe v. Wade chronologically between Griswold v. Connecticut and Bowers v. Hardwick fails to capture abortion as a distinctively woman’s experience – and a highly regulated one at that.***

 

Nonetheless, my project was on, and I began with the question: Why, as we creep ever closer to the half-century mark of Roe v. Wade, is abortion still regarded as so unsettled, perhaps not illegal but certainly criminal-like? What makes this quasi-criminal status possible? I wanted to present the case that to the extent women feel guilty, ashamed, or reticent to speak about an abortion at the level of personal experience, they might be heartened to know that there is an entire structure of American law and culture aimed at bringing about just that result. Regulations that make abortion feel like a criminal act abound: mandatory ultrasounds and waiting periods; legislatively drafted statements that physicians must read to their patients; adoption brochures, and disclosure about paternal financial obligations. Each of these is intended to bring home to women that before they terminate an unwanted pregnancy they should think again, look harder, and not be so selfish.  

March 21, 2017 in Abortion, Books | Permalink | Comments (0)

Monday, March 20, 2017

When Laws Held that Women (but not Men) Lost American Citizenship by Marriage

That Time American Women Lost Their Citizenship Because They Married Foreigners

In March of 1907, Congress passed the Expatriation Act, which decreed, among other things, that U.S. women who married non-citizens were no longer Americans. If their husband later became a naturalized citizen, they could go through the naturalization process to regain citizenship.

 

But none of these rules applied to American men when they chose a spouse.

 

"It's as though she walks under his umbrella. He puts his arm around her and poof! she's a citizen," says Linda Kerber, a professor who teaches gender and legal history at the University of Iowa. "She has had the good sense to come out from these monarchies and opt for an American. She's a sensible woman, we adore her."

 

"Whereas an American-born woman who marries a foreign man, oh my goodness, she is disloyal," Kerber said.

 

When Mackenzie v. Hare — a case challenging the expatriation act that involved a woman married to a British citizen — reached the Supreme Court in 1915, the justices upheld the law, arguing that the women chose to marry knowing this was a consequence so they weren't being forced to expatriate. Then World War I began and hundreds of women found themselves affected by the law.

 

Once American women got the right to vote in 1920, they started lobbying lawmakers, pushing them to recognize that their citizenship should not be tethered to that of a husband. "There's a big scramble in those first two years for members of Congress to get on the good side of women and to get women to join their constituency," Kerber said. Eventually Rep. John Cable, of Ohio, introduced a bill to address the disparity. He may have been motivated by a nearing bid for re-election.

 

The Cable Act of 1922, also known as the Married Women's Independent Nationality Act, said women kept their citizenship if they married a man who could become a citizen even if he opted not to. "It sounds as though the Cable Act fixed it, if they married a man eligible for citizenship," Kerber says. However, "there's a lot of fine print."

 

These expatriated women had to petition the government to regain their citizenship, and their husband's status still played a role in theirs: if he wasn't eligible for citizenship, she could be denied. And if she lived on foreign soil for two years, she could lose her citizenship. 

See also Linda Kerber, chap. 1, No Constitutional Right to be Ladies: Women and the Obligations of Citizenship

Leti Volpp, chap. 3, Expatriation by Marriage: The Case of Asian American Women, in Feminist Legal History: Essays on Women and Law (Tracy A. Thomas & TJ Boisseau, eds).

 

March 20, 2017 in Family, International | Permalink | Comments (0)

EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Employer Questioning about Pregnancy

In light of the article Amid Charges By Former Law Student On Gender Equality, Former Clerks Defend Gorsuch, here's a summary by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission on what the existing state of the law is (and which a future SCOTUS could change) regarding employer treatment based on existing or intended pregnancy.

Questions and Answers about the EEOC's Enforcement Guidance on Pregnancy Discrimination and Related Issues

These Questions and Answers address the EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Pregnancy Discrimination and Related Issues (Guidance) originally released on July 14, 2014, and recently updated in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., --- U.S. ---, 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015). The updated Guidance is available at http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/pregnancy_guidance.cfm.***

1. What workplace actions are prohibited under the PDA?

Under the PDA, an employer cannot fire, refuse to hire, demote, or take any other adverse action against a woman if pregnancy, childbirth, or a related medical condition was a motivating factor in the adverse employment action. The PDA prohibits discrimination with respect to all aspects of employment, including pay, job assignments, promotions, layoffs, training, and fringe benefits (such as leave and health insurance).***

3. May an employer ask an employee or applicant whether she is pregnant or if she intends to become pregnant soon?

Although Title VII does not prohibit employers from asking applicants or employees about gender-related characteristics such as pregnancy, such questions are generally discouraged. The EEOC will consider the fact that an employer has asked such a question when evaluating a charge alleging pregnancy discrimination. Adverse decisions relating to hiring, assignments, or promotion, that are based on an employer's assumptions or stereotypes about pregnant workers' attendance, schedules, physical ability to work, or commitment to their jobs, are unlawful.

March 20, 2017 in Constitutional, Pregnancy, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)

Petition for Cert on Required CAL Disclosures for Pregnancy Crisis Centers as Violating Free Speech

Petition for Certiorari, National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra

QUESTION PRESENTED

The State of California enacted a law called the “Reproductive FACT Act.” The State admits its purpose is targeting “crisis pregnancy centers” based on their viewpoint that “discourag[es]” abortion. The Act forces pro-life religious licensed centers to post notices that encourage women to contact the State to receive information on free or low cost abortions. The Act also burdens pro-life religious unlicensed centers’ speech by requiring them to place extensive disclaimers in large fonts and in as many as 13 languages in their ads, which significantly burdens their ability to advertise. But the Act exempts most other licensed medical and unlicensed non-medical facilities, such as abortion providers, hospitals, and other healthcare facilities, as well as federal health care providers. The Ninth Circuit candidly admits that it upheld the Act amidst a “circuit split” with decisions by the Second and Fourth Circuits over how to scrutinize regulations of speech by medical professionals on controversial health issues. The ruling also conflicts with a recent decision by the Eleventh Circuit.

 

The question presented is: Whether the Free Speech Clause or the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment prohibits California from compelling licensed pro-life centers to post information on how to obtain a state-funded abortion and from compelling unlicensed pro-life centers to disseminate a disclaimer to clients on site and in any print and digital advertising.

The Ninth Circuit's decision below is here.

March 20, 2017 in Abortion, Constitutional, SCOTUS | Permalink | Comments (0)